Hernandez v. Hammond Homes, Ltd., 345 S.W.3d 150

Hernandez worked as a roofer for Brito, the roofing contractor hired by Hammond Homes to install the roof.
In February 2002 Hernandez fell from a ladder on the Hammonds' construction site, becoming paralyzed.
Hernandez sued Hammond Homes for premises liability and negligence, alleging dangerous conditions and lack of fall protection.
Hammond Homes moved for summary judgment claiming no duty existed due to independent-contractor status, lack of control, and Chapter 95 protections.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Hammond Homes.
The court analyzed duty under two theories: negligent activity and premises defect, plus whether Chapter 95 applied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Duty of general contractor to independent-contractor employee	Hernandez asserts Hammond had control rights creating a duty.	No written contract; no actual control over Brito's methods; no duty.	No duty found; no evidentiary basis of actual control over fall-protection
Negligent activity due to independent-contractor work	Employer's control or knowledge could create duty to ensure safety.	Control must relate to injury-causing activity; no actual control shown.	No duty; no actual exercise of control over fall-protection conduct
Premises-condition liability for an independent contractor's employee	Open and obvious dangers may still be premises defects under Moritz.	Danger of falling was open/obvious; no concealment; no duty to warn or repair.	No duty; premises liability not shown
Chapter 95 statutory protections	Chapter 95 may provide defenses for claims against contractors.	Summary judgment proper on common-law grounds; Chapter 95 issues unnecessary to reach.	Not reached; affirm on common-law grounds

Gen. Elec. Co. v. Moritz, 257 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2008) (open/concealed defects and duty to warn on premises defects)
Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1985) (control rights limited to actual conduct over work)
Dow Chemical Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. 2002) (control—whether employer approved dangerous act; distinction from Lee Lewis)
Coastal Marine Serv. of Tex., Inc. v. Lawrence, 988 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1999) (possibility of control is not actual right to control)
Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. 2001) (supervisor's direct approval of fall-protection systems can establish control)
Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. 2009) (duty questions when dealing with independent contractors)