Hernandez-Gil v. Dental Dreams, LLC
1:13-cv-01141
| D.N.M. | Mar 29, 2018Background
- This is a Daubert-style motion: Relator Jose Hernandez-Gil (Plaintiff) moved to exclude portions of defendants’ expert William D. Goren’s testimony in an ADA employment/accommodation dispute.
- Goren is an ADA compliance attorney and author with teaching and consulting experience on ADA issues; Plaintiff did not depose him.
- Plaintiff sought exclusion of three core opinions: (1) that the accommodation Hernandez-Gil insisted on was unreasonable/posed undue hardship; (2) that Hernandez-Gil broke off the interactive process; and (3) that Hernandez-Gil’s dog Boscoe was not a service animal during employment.
- Defendants argued Goren offers factual and “ultimate fact” opinions based on ADA experience, not impermissible legal conclusions.
- The Court applied Rule 702 and Daubert/Kumho principles, distinguishing permissible factual/experience-based testimony from impermissible legal conclusions that would usurp the jury or court.
- Ruling: Court barred Goren from testifying to legal conclusions on reasonableness/undue hardship and that Plaintiff broke the interactive process; otherwise allowed his factual opinions (including on impacts of a dog in the office and whether Boscoe was acting as a service animal).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Goren may opine that requested accommodation was unreasonable/undue hardship | Exclude as legal conclusion that supplants jury and applies law | Goren offers factual/ultimate-fact testimony based on ADA experience, not legal conclusions | Excluded: Goren may not render legal conclusions on reasonableness/undue hardship |
| Whether Goren may opine that Hernandez-Gil broke off the interactive process | Exclude as legal conclusion within jury’s competence | Goren can describe factual interactions and chronology | Excluded only as legal conclusion; factual opinions about the process allowed |
| Whether Goren may testify about operational/health/safety impacts of having a dog in a dental office | Testimony unnecessary or beyond his expertise (e.g., germ migration) | His ADA compliance experience and review of office plans qualify him to give factual impact testimony | Allowed: factual testimony on disruption, risk, sterile-area concerns; methodological gaps go to cross-examination |
| Whether Goren may opine that Boscoe was not acting as a service animal | Not qualified; relies on recognition/response test for Titles II/III, not Title I | Goren has publications and experience on service-animal issues that inform factual analysis | Allowed: Goren may offer factual opinions on whether Boscoe acted as a service animal |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (trial judge gatekeeper for expert admissibility; focus on principles and methodology)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (Daubert gatekeeping applies to non-scientific experts; emphasize experience and methodology)
- 103 Investors I, L.P. v. Square D Co., 470 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 2006) (two-step expert admissibility analysis: qualification and Daubert reliability)
- Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988) (expert may not articulate or apply law so as to usurp jury/bench role)
- United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009) (when based on experience, expert must explain how experience supports opinion and its reliable application)
- United States v. Richter, 796 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2015) (experts may address ultimate issues but cannot state legal conclusions)