950 F. Supp. 2d 298
D. Mass.2013Background
- Hermidasopped pre-suit Chapter 93A claim against Archstone Reading and affiliates over upfront amenity-use fees; class action subsequently certified against Archstone alone; Archstone offered to the Hermidas individually and to the class, offers rejected; court considers whether early settlement offers limit class-achievable fees under Chapter 93A; class prevailed on 93A claim; fees awarded to Hermidas and class after adjustments.
- First Demand Letter (Aug 3, 2010) identified Hermidas’ injury and sought settlement; Archstone offered $665.67 (Sept 1, 2010) to Hermidas only; offer to the class reserved right to limit recovery to relief tendered.
- Second Demand Letter (Oct 21, 2011) on behalf of the certified class; Archstone offered $155,447.47 to class members (Nov 18, 2011) excluding Hermidas; Hermidas filed motion seeking clarification (Feb 2012) which was withdrawn.
- Court analyzes whether a rejection of an offer to an individual claimant can cap fees for the entire class; concludes that fees for the class are recoverable from inception and not barred by the individual rejection.
- Court applies a flexible, non-lodestar approach to calculating Chapter 93A fees, disallowing clerical tasks, reducing for block billing and travel, and applying tiered hourly rates to Hermidas’ and class counsel’s hours; overall awards to Hermidas and the class.
- Court notes that the class action treatment persists from inception and that the common fund doctrine does not govern fee awards in this context.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether class fees may be recovered from inception despite an individual settlement offer. | Hermidas argued class fees are recoverable as the action began as a class action. | Archstone argued rejection of an individual offer should limit class fees. | Class fees recoverable from inception; offer to lead plaintiff does not limit class recovery. |
| Whether rejecting an individual pre-certification offer bars class-wide fees. | Hermidas contends rejection advances class interests and entitles fees. | Archstone maintains fees limited to relief tendered to the individual. | Rejection does not bar class-wide fees; fees allowed for the class. |
| What portion of fees are attributable to the class versus the individual claim. | Hermidas/class counsel incurred time benefiting the class. | Fees should be allocated to the individual claim only where applicable. | Fees allocated to class claims, with deductions for unrelated work and ten percent inter-party adjustment. |
| What method governs calculating Chapter 93A fees. | Court should use flexible, non-lodestar method considering factors. | Lodestar-like scrutiny unnecessary given 93A structure. | Fees determined under a flexible approach with factor-based adjustment. |
| Are fees from the class action awardable to the class as a whole rather than to named plaintiffs? | Fees belong to prevailing party as a whole; class benefits. | Fees should align with who pursued the action. | Fees belong to the prevailing party; class awarded fees. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983) (establishes the general approach to calculating attorneys’ fees in civil rights actions via a lodestar framework and enhancements.)
- Burnham v. Mark IV Homes, Inc., 387 Mass. 575 (Mass. 1982) (permits multiple damages to promote prelitigation settlement.”)
- Kohl v. Silver Lake Motors, Inc., 369 Mass. 795 (Mass. 1976) (recovery under 93A not to exceed relief tendered; fees may pre-date rejection.)
- Richards v. Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L., 66 Mass.App.Ct. 726 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (demand letter may concern individual claim with class implications.)
- Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33 (Mass. 1975) (class action demand letters under 93A; early description suffices.)
- Richards v. Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L., 66 Mass.App.Ct. 726 (Mass.App.Ct. 2006) (describes scope of demand letters and class action dynamics.)
- Suk Jae Chang v. Wozo LLC, 2012 WL 1067643 (D. Mass. 2012) (notes limitations of class-wide remedy when settlement to lead plaintiff is insufficient.)
- Doucette v. Ives, 947 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1991) (treats pre-certification period as class action for fee purposes.)
- Meaney v. OneBeacon Insurance Group, LLC, 2007 WL 5112809 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2007) (illustrates class-action fee considerations in mixed proceedings.)
- Wolf v. Comm’r of Pub. Welfare, 367 Mass. 293 (Mass. 1975) (post-certification representation of class rights.)