Henry Curtis Mayo v. the State of Texas, 02-19-00404-CR

Around midnight in Feb. 2019 Mayo led a ~48‑mile high‑speed chase across multiple counties, reaching speeds above 100 mph in low visibility. He turned his headlights on/off, tailgated and weaved among cars and 18‑wheelers, and was on his cell phone during the chase.
The chase involved officers from multiple agencies; spike strips were deployed and ultimately disabled Mayo’s car, after which he exited still on the phone and was arrested.
The State introduced witness testimony (citizen caller, responding officers, deputies) and three videos: Deputy Scudder’s body‑camera (audio heavy), Scudder’s dash cam (first ~2 minutes), and Deputy Tharp’s dash cam (~22 minutes).
Mayo admitted speeding and fleeing but testified he fled out of fear for his life (necessity) and denied using his vehicle as a deadly weapon.
A jury convicted Mayo of evading arrest/detention with a vehicle and found the deadly‑weapon allegation true; the trial court assessed punishment (8 years).
On appeal Mayo challenged admission of (1) allegedly speculative testimony and (2) hearsay statements in Scudder’s bodycam; he also argued the deadly‑weapon finding was unsupported. The court also corrected clerical errors in the judgment (punishment assessed by court, not jury).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admission of Deputy Scudder’s testimony that Mayo was trying to cause other vehicles to crash	State: testimony was probative and matched contemporaneous radio/dash recordings	Mayo: the statement was speculative/opinion testimony	Any error harmless—same statements were on unchallenged dash‑cam/audio and cumulative evidence supported the point
Admission of statements recorded on Deputy Scudder’s body‑camera (police‑radio narration)	State: narration was cumulative and available on other recordings/tests	Mayo: bodycam audio was inadmissible hearsay	Any error harmless—challenged statements duplicated on unchallenged dash‑cam/audio and in testimony
Sufficiency of evidence for deadly‑weapon finding based on driving	State: speeds >100 mph, weaving, tailgating, near collisions, disabling headlights, and near‑crashes exposed others to death/serious injury	Mayo: conduct showed only hypothetical potential, not actual danger to anyone	Evidence sufficient: manner of vehicle use presented an actual danger; jury reasonably found deadly‑weapon true
Clerical errors in written judgment re: who assessed punishment	State/court: record shows punishment was tried to the court, not jury	Mayo: (benefit of correction)	Court modified judgment sua sponte to reflect punishment assessed by trial court

Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (improperly admitted evidence harmless if same facts shown by other unchallenged evidence)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for sufficiency review: view evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (vehicle is a deadly weapon only if manner of use presents an actual danger)
Moore v. State, 520 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (actual danger is a potentiality; manner of use analysis for vehicles)
Sierra v. State, 280 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (two‑part test for deadly‑weapon finding: manner of use and capability to cause death/serious injury)
Couthren v. State, 571 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (applying Jackson sufficiency standard)
Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (harmlessness where challenged evidence is cumulative of unchallenged evidence)
Ex parte Poe, 751 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (definition and correction of clerical errors in judgments)