Henriquez, Martin Roberto
WR-77,209-02
| Tex. App. | Jul 31, 2015Background
- Martin Henriquez filed a state habeas corpus application; the trial habeas court recommended denial of relief on July 13, 2015.
- Henriquez objects to that recommendation and contends the habeas court failed to make independent findings on multiple ineffective-assistance and indictment-related claims.
- Primary complaints: trial counsel allegedly failed to challenge the indictment’s sufficiency for continuous sexual abuse of a child (CSAC) because the indictment allegedly (a) did not specify which particular indecency-with-a-child (IWC) offense under Tex. Penal Code §21.11 was charged and (b) omitted the statutory intent language (“with intent to arouse or gratify”).
- Henriquez argues the habeas court improperly deferred to counsel’s unarticulated strategy instead of independently determining whether the alleged errors occurred and whether prejudice under Strickland resulted.
- Henriquez requests either a new trial or, at minimum, an evidentiary hearing so counsel can be required to articulate strategy and the court can make explicit findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Henriquez) | Defendant's Argument (State / counsel) | Held (trial habeas court) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether habeas court made independent findings on ineffective-assistance claims | Habeas court deferred to counsel’s assertion of strategy without independent factual findings; Strickland requires the court to determine whether the alleged omissions actually occurred and, if so, whether prejudice exists | Counsel and State relied on counsel’s affidavit and asserted decisions were strategic; State invoked ALBA to justify pleading choices | Habeas court recommended denying relief (found no entitlement) and relied substantially on counsel’s explanations rather than making fuller independent findings |
| Whether the indictment sufficiently alleged the elements/manner of IWC under §21.11 for CSAC notice requirements | Indictment failed to identify which statutory variant of IWC was charged (multiple alternative means exist); notice requires pleading the manner/means so defendant knows precise charge | State argued (relying on ALBA) that IWC operates as an aggravating feature of CSAC and the indictment was sufficient | Henriquez contends omission rendered the indictment constitutionally insufficient; habeas court nonetheless recommended denial without detailed findings on this point |
| Whether omission of intent language in the indictment ("intent to arouse or gratify") fatally failed to charge an offense | Failure to allege the required sexual-intent element renders the indictment defective and reversible (citing Wesley, Studer) | Counsel said based on indictment review and strategy there was no reason to file motions challenging indictment | Habeas court recommended denying relief; Henriquez objects that the court did not analyze whether the element was pleaded and whether counsel’s failure to challenge was deficient |
| Whether the matter requires an evidentiary hearing/remand | If the habeas court did not make independent findings and counsel did not articulate strategy, an evidentiary hearing is required to develop record and resolve Strickland issues | State relied on counsel’s affidavit and existing record to oppose hearing | Habeas court denied relief without full findings; Henriquez asks for remand and evidentiary hearing to permit counsel to explain strategy and to let the court determine prejudice under Strickland |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (presumption of reasonable trial strategy strongest on direct appeal; court must still assess counsel performance in collateral proceedings)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Alba v. State, 905 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (discussed by State regarding relation of underlying offenses to enhanced charges)
- Jacobsen v. State, 325 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. App.—? Dist. 2010) (indictment for CSAC set out multiple specific IWC offenses to give notice)
- Wesley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (failure to allege intent-to-arouse/gratify is reversible error)
- Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (indictment/information must sufficiently charge the offense)
- Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (notice derives from the face of the indictment, not jury charge)
- Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (when statute lists alternative means, indictment must specify which means)
- Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (examples on charging multiple statutory alternatives under sexual-offense statutes)