Hendrix v. Napolitano
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2199
| D.D.C. | 2015Background
- Leroy Hendrix, a Secret Service Special Agent, had his Top Secret security clearance suspended (Oct 2010) and later revoked (Oct 2011); he was placed on “Do Not Admit” status and could not access secure facilities.
- The Secret Service issued an indefinite suspension (effective Jan 14, 2012) tied to the clearance revocation and later proposed Hendrix’s removal for failure to maintain the required clearance.
- A removal decision upholding the proposed removal set an effective removal date of October 1, 2012; Hendrix retired effective September 30, 2012.
- Hendrix originally pleaded five counts: Title VII race discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment (Counts I–III), constructive discharge/wrongful termination (Count IV), and equitable relief (Count V). He voluntarily dismissed Counts I–III.
- Defendant (Secretary of DHS) moved to dismiss and for summary judgment arguing security-clearance decisions are nonjusticiable under Egan and that Hendrix’s retirement was not an involuntary constructive discharge.
- The court limited review to Counts IV and V, granted summary judgment for the Secretary on Count IV, and dismissed Count V for failure to state a claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hendrix’s retirement was a constructive discharge | Hendrix contends he was compelled to retire the day before removal, so retirement was involuntary (duress/compulsion). | Secretary argues Hendrix faced imminent removal for cause after clearance revocation; choosing retirement does not make it involuntary. | Court: Retirement was voluntary; facing removal for cause does not constitute constructive discharge. |
| Whether a constructive-discharge claim can rest on Title VII claims Hendrix withdrew | Hendrix initially alleged Title VII discrimination, retaliation, hostile environment as bases for constructive discharge. | Secretary notes Hendrix voluntarily dismissed Title VII counts and Title VII constructive-discharge requires aggravating factors beyond discrimination. | Court: Because Title VII claims were withdrawn, any constructive-discharge theory premised on them fails as a matter of law. |
| Whether court may review clearance-revocation facts | Hendrix disavows challenging the clearance revocation but asserts duress-based constructive discharge. | Secretary relies on Egan: security-clearance decisions are committed to Executive discretion and generally nonjusticiable absent constitutional claims. | Court: Court cannot review the substance of the clearance revocation; Egan bars judicial review here. |
| Whether discovery should be allowed before summary judgment | Hendrix sought discovery under Rule 56(d) to obtain documents and depose witnesses to oppose summary judgment. | Secretary contends undisputed facts preclude an essential element of Hendrix’s claim; no proper Rule 56(d) showing made. | Court: Hendrix failed to make the required Rule 56(d) showing; discovery would not change the outcome; summary judgment appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (executive discretion over security-clearance decisions; generally nonjusticiable)
- Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir.) (Title VII constructive-discharge requires aggravating factors beyond discrimination)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard; burden on nonmoving party to show essential elements)
- Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (constructive discharge objective standard)
- Keyes v. Dist. of Columbia, 372 F.3d 434 (D.C. Cir.) (duress/compulsion test for involuntary resignation)
- Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir.) (aggravating factors prevent remediation on the job)
- Oryszak v. Sullivan, 388 F.3d 522 (D.C. Cir.) (security-clearance actions committed to agency discretion absent constitutional claim)
- Aliotta v. Bair, 614 F.3d 556 (D.C. Cir.) (presumption that resignations/retirements are voluntary)