Hemming v. State, 229 A.3d 825

Jonathan Hemming was arrested after a confrontation with SID officers in May 2016 during which he brandished improvised "zip gun" firearms; police recovered another improvised firearm and ammunition in the vehicle.
Hemming was indicted on multiple counts arising from the single incident, including attempted murder/assault, use of a firearm in a crime of violence, resisting arrest, and several counts charging possession of a regulated firearm or ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing firearms.
Before trial Hemming moved to bifurcate the possession/ammunition (criminal-in-possession) counts so that the jury would decide the violent-offense counts and the judge would decide the prohibited-possession counts (Hemming was willing to waive a jury for those counts), aiming to avoid prejudice from evidence of his prior conviction.
The circuit court denied the motion, the parties instead entered a Carter stipulation that Hemming was a prohibited person (without detailing the prior conviction), and the jury convicted Hemming on multiple counts including the possession/ammunition counts.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed; this Court granted certiorari to decide whether Maryland Rule 4-253(c) permits a single trial split between two different factfinders (hybrid judge/jury bifurcation) and whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the requested bifurcation.

Issue	Hemming's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Md. Rule 4-253(c) authorizes bifurcating counts between different factfinders in a single trial (judge decides some counts; jury decides others).	Rule 4-253(c)’s catchall (“any other relief as justice requires”) permits a hybrid bifurcated trial to avoid prejudice from prior-conviction evidence.	Rule 4-253(c) does not authorize splitting decision-making between judge and jury; the hybrid procedure causes procedural problems (partial jury-waiver, risk of inconsistent judge/jury verdicts) and lacks jurisprudential support.	The Court held Rule 4-253(c) does not permit bifurcating counts between different factfinders in a single trial; such hybrid judge/jury bifurcation is impermissible.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Hemming’s motion to bifurcate (as requested).	Denial was an abuse because bifurcation would reduce prejudice and judicial economy favors a single hybrid proceeding.	Trial court correctly concluded it lacked authority to conduct the requested hybrid bifurcation; a Carter stipulation and/or a Joshua-style bifurcation (same jury in two phases) are available ameliorative tools.	The Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion—it correctly determined it lacked authority to order the hybrid judge/jury bifurcation requested; affirming the intermediate court.

Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379 (2002) (discussed hybrid judge/jury bifurcation and held inconsistent verdicts between judge and jury impermissible)
Carter v. State, 374 Md. 693 (2003) (held trial judge may not bifurcate elements of a criminal-in-possession charge; required acceptance of defendant’s stipulation limiting jury disclosure of prior conviction)
United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1992) (approved a two-phase jury trial where the same jury first considered substantive charges and later considered the felon-in-possession count)
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (Supreme Court decision explaining balancing probative value vs. prejudice of prior-conviction evidence)
State v. Knight, 266 Conn. 658 (2003) (Connecticut Supreme Court considered judge/jury split verdicts in a hybrid proceeding and reached a different view than Maryland’s Galloway)
McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604 (1977) (explained Rule 4-253’s federal pattern and the common-law test for joinder/severance)