HELMS, MARLO S., PEOPLE v
KA 13-00647
| N.Y. App. Div. | Jul 8, 2016Background
- Defendant pleaded guilty in Georgia (1999) to residential burglary under former Ga. Code Ann. § 16-7-1(a) and later pleaded guilty in Monroe County Court, NY, to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
- At sentencing in New York, the People treated the Georgia burglary as a predicate violent felony, exposing defendant to enhanced sentencing as a second violent felony offender.
- The core legal question: whether the Georgia burglary conviction is "strictly equivalent" to New York burglary such that it may serve as a predicate felony for enhanced sentencing.
- Georgia burglary statute (as written in 1999) penalized entry or remaining in a dwelling "without authority and with intent to commit a felony or theft therein" — it did not use the word "knowingly."
- New York burglary (Penal Law § 140.25[2]) requires that a person "knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein," making "knowingly" an express element.
- Majority held the Georgia conviction is not strictly equivalent because Georgia’s statute lacks the explicit "knowingly" element; vacated the sentence and remitted for resentencing. Justice Curran dissented, arguing statutory text and Georgia case law show an intent/knowledge mens rea equivalent to NY law and would affirm.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Georgia burglary conviction is "strictly equivalent" to NY burglary for predicate-felon sentencing | People: Georgia statute is equivalent and supports predicate status | Helms: Georgia statute lacks NY's "knowingly" element and cannot be a predicate | Majority: Not equivalent—vacated sentence and remitted for resentencing |
| Whether absence of the word "knowingly" in Georgia statute means absence of mens rea element | People: Georgia law, doctrine, and case law supply mens rea; text differences are not dispositive | Helms: NY requires an element NY statute explicitly contains; Georgia statute omits it so fails strict equivalency | Majority: Omission of "knowingly" is an essential difference; Georgia conviction insufficient |
| Proper scope of equivalency inquiry (text only vs. text + foreign case law) | People: Courts may consider foreign statutes and case law to interpret elements | Helms: Equivalency should consider foreign statutory scheme and cases to identify mens rea | Majority: Adheres to Court of Appeals rule limiting inquiry to comparison of statutory elements; declines to read Georgia case law into the statutory elements for equivalency |
| Whether precedent supports using Georgia burglary as predicate | People: First Dept. and other authorities (Toliver, Hall) treated Georgia offenses as equivalent | Helms: Those cases support equivalency when interpreted with Georgia law; majority disagrees | Majority: Cites Ramos and similar authority to reject Toliver’s reliance here; modifies judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Ramos, 19 N.Y.3d 417 (establishes strict equivalency standard for foreign convictions)
- People v Jurgins, 26 N.Y.3d 607 (limits inquiry to comparison of statutory elements; permits limited interpretive use of foreign law)
- People v Muniz, 74 N.Y.2d 464 (principles regarding element comparison and equivalency)
- People v Toliver, 226 A.D.2d 255 (First Dept. decision treating Georgia burglary in a manner relevant to equivalency)
- People v Nieves-Rojas, 126 A.D.3d 1373 (remand for resentencing following vacatur of predicate-based sentence)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (federal guidance on generic burglary elements referenced in analysis)