Helf v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
2015 UT 81
| Utah | 2015Background
- Chevron refinery used an open-air concrete pit to hold liquid and solid wastes; high-pH caustic sludge was dumped into the pit and neutralized by adding sulfuric acid and roiling with compressed air.
- During a day shift neutralization, sulfuric acid reacted with sulfides in the sludge to produce a hydrogen sulfide cloud that triggered alarms ~150 feet away and made workers in other areas ill; managers halted neutralization pending evaluation.
- At shift change the day-shift personnel warned the night-shift supervisor and the night-shift pit operator (Jenna Helf) about the day incident; the night-shift supervisor nevertheless instructed Helf to neutralize the pit; Helf (a three‑month trainee) was exposed to concentrated hydrogen sulfide and suffered permanent injuries.
- Helf received workers’ compensation benefits and later sued Chevron alleging an intentional tort because supervisors knew injury was virtually certain if neutralization continued.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Chevron, holding Helf failed to produce evidence that any Chevron manager had the requisite subjective knowledge; the court rejected Chevron’s election‑of‑remedies defense. The Supreme Court of Utah reverses and remands.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment was proper on Helf’s intentional‑tort claim (requiring an agent who knew injury was virtually certain) | Helf argued documentary and testimonial evidence (alarms, coworker illnesses, warnings at shift change, experienced operator’s precautions) permit a jury to infer a supervisor knew injury was virtually certain. | Chevron argued no single manager had the requisite subjective knowledge and evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. | Reversed: A genuine issue of material fact exists—viewing evidence in Helf’s favor a reasonable jury could find the night‑shift supervisor (or a senior manager with authority) knew injury was virtually certain. |
| Admissibility of union safety representative’s deposition testimony (statements that day supervisor told night supervisor workers got sick) | Helf argued Chevron waived foundation/nonresponsiveness objections by not raising them at the deposition; the testimony is admissible for summary judgment. | Chevron argued the testimony was hearsay, lacked personal knowledge and foundation; trial court excluded portions sua sponte. | Court held the district court erred to exclude the testimony on waiver grounds; the testimony should be considered on summary judgment. |
| Whether receiving workers’ compensation bars a subsequent intentional‑tort suit (election of remedies) | Helf argued modern pleading practice and equitable concerns forbid forcing an employee to choose early between compensation and a tort claim; receipt of benefits should not bar a tort suit (but benefits must be reimbursed if tort recovery occurs). | Chevron contended election of remedies or exclusive‑remedy principles bar Helf from pursuing tort after accepting workers’ compensation. | Held: Election of remedies does not bar the intentional‑tort suit; worker may pursue both forums though any tort recovery will require reimbursement/subrogation to avoid double recovery. |
| Procedural propriety of Chevron’s cross‑appeal to raise election‑of‑remedies as alternative ground | Helf argued Chevron improperly cross‑appealed; only an appellee’s brief may present alternative affirmance grounds. | Chevron filed a cross‑appeal but sought affirmance on the alternative ground. | Court dismissed the cross‑appeal as improper but nevertheless considered Chevron’s election‑of‑remedies argument on the merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 203 P.3d 962 (Utah 2009) (prior opinion recognizing intentional‑tort exception when employer knew or expected injury)
- Bryan v. Utah Int’l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975) (recognized intentional‑act exception to workers’ compensation exclusive remedy)
- Adams v. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 508 N.W.2d 464 (Mich. 1993) (corporate scienter cannot be established by aggregating disparate employee knowledge)
- Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying summary judgment where supervisor ordered worker into contact with toxic substance)
- Parrish v. Tahtaras, 318 P.2d 642 (Utah 1957) (modern pleading permits alternative remedies and late amendment to conform to proof)
- Woodson v. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1991) (permitting simultaneous pursuit of workers’ compensation benefits and intentional‑tort suit, with reimbursement to avoid double recovery)