Helen Mining Co v. James Elliott, Sr.
859 F.3d 226
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- James E. Elliott, Sr., worked over 23 years in coal mining and filed a BLBA claim (filed 2012) asserting a totally disabling respiratory impairment caused by coal dust; he qualified for the § 921(c)(4) fifteen-year presumption because he demonstrated disability and qualifying employment.
- The presumption shifts the burden to the party opposing benefits (the responsible operator here, Helen Mining) to rebut disability causation.
- The Department of Labor promulgated a 2013 regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 718.305(d)(1)(ii), requiring any party opposing entitlement (Secretary or operator) to "establish that no part" of the miner’s total respiratory disability was caused by pneumoconiosis — i.e., a ‘‘rule out’’ standard.
- At hearing the ALJ credited Elliott’s entitlement under the presumption and found Helen Mining’s medical experts (Drs. Fino and Spagnolo) unpersuasive; the ALJ applied the rule-out standard and concluded the operator failed to rebut the presumption.
- The Benefits Review Board affirmed: it held the 2013 regulation validly filled the statutory gap and that the ALJ’s credibility/weight findings were supported by substantial evidence; Helen Mining appealed to the Third Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of 2013 regulation imposing a "rule out" rebuttal standard on operators | Regulation is a permissible exercise of the Secretary’s authority to fill a statutory gap and furthers BLBA purposes | Ultra vires: § 921(c)(4) speaks only to the Secretary; Congress’s silence means operators cannot be held to Secretary’s rebuttal standard | Regulation is valid under Chevron; Congress was silent/ambiguous and agency’s rule is a reasonable gap-filling construction |
| Appropriate Chevron analysis | Deference to the agency is warranted given expertise and complex scheme | Chevron step-one shows statute limits rebuttal language to the Secretary; regulation improperly extends it to operators | Court applies Chevron: Step One finds ambiguity; Step Two defers to the Secretary as interpretation is reasonable |
| Consistency with precedent (e.g., Usery) | Prior cases and regulations support a rule-out standard for opposing parties; Usery did not preclude regulation | Usery established that § 921(c)(4) addressed only the Secretary, so operators should face a lesser burden | Usery does not resolve the question; subsequent statutory/regulatory developments and precedent support the rule-out standard |
| Whether ALJ properly rejected operator’s medical evidence under the rule-out standard | ALJ reasonably discredited operator’s experts as inconsistent with regulatory Preamble and internally inconsistent | Operator contends ALJ misread the Preamble and misstated expert testimony | ALJ’s credibility determinations are supported by substantial evidence; operator failed to rebut the presumption |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations)
- Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680 (1991) (discussing BLBA regulatory scheme and agency role)
- Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (addressing scope of § 921(c)(4) rebuttal language as applied to operators)
- Carozza v. U.S. Steel Corp., 727 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1984) (approving a rule-out standard for parties opposing benefits)
- Kline v. Dir., OWCP, 877 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1989) (describing rule-out language as imposing a rigorous rebuttal burden)
- Bonessa v. U.S. Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1989) (interpreting causal standard for disability under BLBA)
- Bender v. W. Va. CWP Fund, 782 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 2015) (upholding the 2013 regulation as a permissible construction)