Hector Santana v. Miami-Dade County
688 F. App'x 763
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- In March 2012 Miami‑Dade detectives arranged two controlled buys and obtained a search warrant for Michael Santana’s home based on suspected marijuana sales; investigators learned the subject was known to carry a gun and relayed that in a pre‑execution briefing to the SRT team, including Officer German Alech.
- The SRT executed a forced entry at night. Alech entered first as shield operator, in uniform and carrying a shield labeled “POLICE.” Officers’ announcements before entry are disputed; appellate court assumed no announcement.
- Upon entry Santana ran by with a handgun, took cover, and (according to officers) crouched in a position described as “threatening,” pointing the gun toward Alech while failing to obey commands to drop the weapon and get on his knees.
- Witness Retkofsky gave slightly different testimony that Santana said “okay” and his hands rose and the gun slid or fell at roughly the same instant he was shot; the encounter lasted 5–10 seconds.
- Alech fired three shots, killing Santana; officers later recovered two more firearms in the residence. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (unlawful entry and excessive force) against Alech and brought state negligence and wrongful death claims against Miami‑Dade County.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity and state‑law grounds; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding (1) a reasonable officer could have believed exigent circumstances justified a no‑knock entry, and (2) Alech reasonably perceived an imminent threat justifying deadly force, so qualified immunity applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Alech’s entry without announcing violated the Fourth Amendment | Santana’s estate: entry was unlawful because officers failed to knock/announce | Officers: briefing info that suspect was an armed drug dealer gave arguable reasonable suspicion for a no‑knock entry | Held: No‑knock entry was justified; Alech entitled to qualified immunity on unlawful‑entry claim |
| Whether Alech’s use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment | Estate: trial witness suggests Santana was beginning to surrender (hands up, gun slid) so force was excessive | Alech: Santana ran with a gun, ignored commands, then crouched pointing the gun—split‑second perception of imminent threat justified shooting | Held: Use of deadly force was objectively reasonable; qualified immunity applies to excessive‑force claim |
| Whether any constitutional violation (if found) was clearly established | Estate: prior cases show officers may not use force on compliant/restrained suspects | Defendants: precedent distinguishes those cases because Santana was armed and not secured; no controlling precedent put Alech on notice | Held: No clearly established law put conduct beyond debate; qualified immunity applies |
| County liability under state law (negligence/wrongful death) | Estate: County negligent in entry and perimeter security; unlawful entry/force caused death | County: entry and force were reasonable; no breach of duty or causal basis for state claims | Held: State negligence and wrongful death claims fail because entry and use of force were reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (no‑knock rule and knock‑and‑announce framework)
- Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (exceptions to knock‑and‑announce for exigent circumstances)
- Whittier v. Kobayashi, 581 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2009) (qualified immunity analysis for no‑knock entries where suspect had access to firearms)
- Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (standard for knock‑and‑announce exceptions; showing not high)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (objective‑reasonableness Fourth Amendment excessive‑force standard)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (deadly force against fleeing suspect rules informing excessive‑force analysis)
- McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (reasonableness where officer could perceive imminent threat)
- Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 2000) (distinguished: use of force on secured/handcuffed/compliant suspect)
- Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (force on a secured/arrested suspect)
- Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (force on compliant/handcuffed detainee)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (split‑second decisions; the need for particularized clearly established law)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (clearly established law must be particularized to facts)