Hector Pabon v. Warden
15-15480
| 11th Cir. | Dec 14, 2017Background
- Hector Pabon was convicted of second-degree murder in Florida and sentenced to life; the Florida Fourth District affirmed on July 30, 2008.
- Pabon did not seek further direct review; his conviction became final after the 90-day certiorari window expired on October 28, 2008.
- Pabon claims he did not learn the direct-appeal outcome until September 29, 2010, and filed a motion for post-conviction relief in state court on October 28, 2011; the state courts denied relief and the Fourth District issued mandate on December 6, 2013.
- Pabon filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 12, 2014—one year and six days after the state-postconviction mandate—beyond AEDPA’s one-year limitations period.
- The district court dismissed the petition as time-barred; Pabon sought equitable tolling. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo and appointed counsel, but affirmed the dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AEDPA limitations tolled by a 90‑day certiorari window after state post‑conviction mandate | Pabon: the 90‑day certiorari window applicable on direct appeal should also apply to state post‑conviction proceedings | State: Supreme Court precedent forecloses applying a certiorari tolling window to post‑conviction mandates | Court: Rejects Pabon; Lawrence controls—no 90‑day tolling for post‑conviction mandate |
| Whether Martinez v. Ryan alters the tolling rule for post‑conviction proceedings | Pabon: Martinez equates certain collateral proceedings to direct appeal for ineffective‑assistance claims, so certiorari window should apply | State: Martinez addresses procedural default, not AEDPA limitations or tolling rules | Court: Martinez does not alter Lawrence; it does not affect AEDPA’s tolling analysis |
| Whether equitable tolling applies to the 1 year + 6 day gap after state mandate and before § 2254 filing | Pabon: prior counsel ineffectiveness and confusing state orders justify equitable tolling | State: Petitioner failed to show diligence or an extraordinary circumstance; vague allegations insufficient | Court: Denies equitable tolling—Pabon did not show diligence or extraordinary circumstances |
| Whether any earlier periods (e.g., between conviction finality and state post‑conviction filing) require resolution to decide timeliness | Pabon: sought to expand record to show delay before state filing might be tolled | State: Even if earlier tolling granted, the post‑mandate gap still bars petition | Court: No need to decide earlier period; petition barred by the post‑mandate gap |
Key Cases Cited
- San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011) (standard of review and AEDPA tolling timing principles)
- Chavers v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 468 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006) (judgment finality tied to certiorari window)
- Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007) (postconviction proceedings do not create a certiorari‑period tolling; § 2244(d)(2) ends when state collateral review concludes)
- Wainwright v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 537 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007) (mandate ends state collateral relief pendency for AEDPA purposes)
- Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (equitable‑tolling test: diligence plus extraordinary circumstance)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (narrow equitable exception for procedural‑default claims tied to ineffective assistance of post‑conviction counsel; does not address AEDPA limitations)