Hector Mancilla-Delafuente v. Loretta E. Lynch
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19104
9th Cir.2015Background
- Hector Mancilla-Delafuente, a Mexican national who entered the U.S. without inspection in 1997, was convicted in Nevada (Mar. 27, 2009) of conspiracy to possess a credit card without consent under Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 199.480 and 205.690(2).
- Sentencing: Mancilla pleaded guilty, received fines/fees totaling $775, and two days’ credit for time served; he was not sentenced to a year in custody.
- DHS initiated removal proceedings in 2010 charging inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
- The IJ and BIA found Mancilla’s conviction was a categorical crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) because the Nevada statute requires intent to defraud, and thus he was ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
- The BIA determined the petty-offense exception did not apply because Nevada’s conspiracy statute (a gross misdemeanor) carried a potential one-year sentence, and the BIA looks to the maximum possible sentence, not the actual sentence imposed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mancilla’s Nevada conspiracy/credit-card offense is categorically a CIMT | Mancilla: conviction is not a categorical CIMT (relies on differing statutes/case law) | Government/BIA: Nevada statute requires intent to defraud, which is a CIMT | Conviction is categorically a CIMT because the statute requires intent to defraud |
| Whether the modified categorical approach is required | Mancilla: statute may be divisible or permit alternative means (invoking Soliman) | Government/BIA: statute has no alternative elements; intent to defraud applies to all conduct, so categorical approach controls | Modified categorical approach not applicable; categorical match suffices |
| Whether petty-offense exception (max <1 year) applies | Mancilla: actual sentence was less than one year, so exception should apply | Government/BIA: statute’s potential maximum (one year) governs eligibility regardless of actual sentence | Exception inapplicable because conspiracy statute carried potential one-year imprisonment |
| Whether court must defer to BIA’s interpretation of moral turpitude and use of potential sentence | Mancilla: challenges BIA’s interpretation/approach | Government/BIA: BIA’s interpretation is reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference | Court defers to BIA; BIA’s views are reasonable and controlling |
Key Cases Cited
- Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (fraud offenses constitute crimes involving moral turpitude)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach to prior offenses)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limits modified categorical approach to divisible statutes)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deference to reasonable agency interpretations)
- Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (two-step CIMT analysis and review standards)
- Mendoza v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 2010) (BIA interpretation of moral turpitude reviewed under Chevron)
- Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012) (fraud-based crimes are moral turpitude crimes)
- Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2004) (statutory reading of § 1229b(b)(1) regarding disqualifying convictions)