891 F.3d 49
2d Cir.2018Background
- Joseph Hechavarria, a Jamaican national, was ordered removed after an aggravated-felony-based deportability finding following a 2011 state conviction; he was held in DHS custody beginning 2013.
- He filed administrative appeals and a petition for review in this Court; the Second Circuit granted a stay of removal pending resolution of his petition (stay remained in place).
- While the petition for review (and stay) were pending, Hechavarria filed a federal habeas petition challenging the legality of his detention.
- The district court treated his detention as governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (the post-removal "removal period") and denied habeas relief.
- Hechavarria appealed; the question presented was whether detention during a court-ordered stay of removal is governed by § 1231 or § 1226(c).
- The Second Circuit reversed, holding § 1231 does not apply while a court-ordered stay postpones the removal period and directing reconsideration under § 1226(c) in light of Supreme Court precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Hechavarria's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which INA provision governs detention while a court-ordered stay of removal is in effect? | Detention is governed by § 1226(c) (pre-removal/criminal-alien detention statute). | Detention is governed by § 1231 (the 90-day removal-period statute) because the order was administratively final. | § 1226(c) governs when a court has issued a stay; § 1231 does not apply until the removal period is triggered by the court's final order. |
| Does a court-ordered stay prevent the § 1231 "removal period" from commencing? | Yes; § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii) delays the removal period until the court issues its final order. | No; administratively final orders should start § 1231 regardless of pending judicial review. | Yes; the statute unambiguously delays the removal period until the court's final order after a stay, so § 1231 is inapplicable during the stay. |
| What remedy/standard applies under § 1226(c) post-Jennings for prolonged mandatory detention? | (Implicit) § 1226(c) detention should be tested for constitutional limits (e.g., bail/hearing). | (Implicit) § 1226(c) mandates detention and is not subject to a bright-line time limit. | The court held § 1226(c) governs and remanded to the district court to apply the correct statutory framework and to consider appropriate relief in light of Jennings and related precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (statute limiting indefinite post-removal detention via a reasonableness presumption)
- Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (Supreme Court rejected applying constitutional-avoidance to read time limits into § 1226(c))
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (voided residual clause in immigration aggravated-felony definition)
- Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985) (statutory interpretation begins with plain text)
- Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015) (previous Second Circuit decision applying a six-month bail-hearing rule under § 1226(c))
- Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003) (de novo review of habeas challenges to immigration detention)
- Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (individualized reasonableness inquiry for § 1226(c) detentions)
- Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (bail/hearing framework for prolonged § 1226(c) detention)