Heather Gudex v. Franklin Collection Service, Inc., 2026 WI 6

Gudex sued Franklin after receiving a debt-collection letter she claimed violated the Wisconsin Consumer Act and sought class damages and injunctive relief. 1
Before filing the class damages claim, Gudex sent Franklin statutory notice and demand, then Franklin offered her individual actual damages, the maximum statutory penalty, and a stipulation to stop using the letter language. 2
Franklin argued its offer was an “appropriate remedy” under WIS. STAT. § 426.110(4)(c) and barred the class damages action. 3
The circuit court certified the class, holding the statute required an appropriate remedy to the whole class, and the court of appeals affirmed. 4
The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding § 426.110(4)(c) requires an appropriate remedy to the named plaintiff, not the putative class. 5
The concurring justice agreed the statute targets the named plaintiff but stressed § 426.110(4)(c) is an affirmative defense and should not be decided at class certification. 6

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Who must receive the “appropriate remedy” under § 426.110(4)(c)? 7	Gudex said the remedy must be offered to the putative class.	Franklin said an offer to Gudex alone sufficed.	The remedy need only be given or agreed to be given to Gudex. 8
Could Franklin defeat class certification by raising § 426.110(4)(c)? 9	Gudex said certification turns only on class-certification requirements.	Franklin said its offer barred maintenance of the damages class.	The majority reversed because the circuit court relied on an incorrect interpretation of § 426.110(4)(c). 10
Does § 426.110(4)(c) apply to class certification or merits? 11	Gudex said it should not control certification.	Franklin raised it to defeat certification.	The concurrence said it is an affirmative defense for merits proceedings, not certification. 12
Does the statute’s class-action policy require class-wide relief? 13	Gudex said the statute should be read to preserve consumer class actions.	Franklin said the text permits “picking off” the named plaintiff.	No; text controls and class-wide relief is addressed separately in § 426.110(4)(d). 14

McDaniel v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 416 Wis. 2d 516, 21 N.W.3d 749 (Wis. 2025) (class-certification review requires correct law; merits issues should not be shoehorned into certification 15)
Wisconsin Just. Initiative, Inc. v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 407 Wis. 2d 87, 990 N.W.2d 122 (Wis. 2023) (statutory interpretation begins with text, context, and structure 16)
State v. Watkins, 255 Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244 (Wis. 2002) (defines affirmative defenses as new facts or arguments defeating a claim even if allegations are true 17)
Wenke v. Gehl Co., 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405 (Wis. 2004) (example of a statute using “no action may be maintained” to create a merits-based defense 18)
Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 325 Wis. 2d 135, 785 N.W.2d 302 (Wis. 2010) (WCA provisions are liberally construed to protect consumers 19)
First Wisconsin National Bank of Milwaukee v. Nicolaou, 113 Wis. 2d 524, 335 N.W.2d 390 (Wis. 1983) (private enforcement of consumer-protection laws should be facilitated 20)
Garcia v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 273 Wis. 2d 612, 682 N.W.2d 365 (Wis. 2004) (remedial statutes should be liberally construed to advance the legislative remedy 21)
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (U.S. 2016) (unaccepted individual settlement offer does not moot a class claim under federal law 22)