Heath Adkisson v. Blytheville School District 5, 762 F.3d 765

Arkansas enacted the Public School Choice Act of 2013 (Act 1227), which permits students to transfer between districts but allows a school district to declare an exemption if it is subject to a federal desegregation order and to notify the Department of Education by April 1 when it will opt out for the next school year.
Parents of children residing in Blytheville School District No. 5 applied to transfer out under the Act but the Blytheville Board passed a resolution (April 29, 2013) opting the district out for the 2013–2014 school year.
The parents sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, alleging equal protection and due process violations, and moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the District to rescind the April 29 resolution for the 2013–2014 year.
The district court denied the preliminary injunction; the parents appealed that denial to the Eighth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit raised mootness sua sponte and held the appeal moot because the requested preliminary relief was expressly limited to the April 29 resolution and the 2013–2014 school year, which had ended, so no effective relief could now be granted.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the interlocutory appeal of denial of a preliminary injunction is justiciable or moot	Plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring rescission of the April 29, 2013 resolution so their children could transfer for 2013–2014; relief remains needed	District argued the requested relief was time-limited to 2013–2014 and that the school year has ended, so appeal is moot	Appeal dismissed as moot — injunction request was limited to the expired 2013–2014 school year and thus no effective relief is possible
Whether the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception applies	Plaintiffs contended the dispute could recur and evade review	District argued plaintiffs can litigate permanent and declaratory relief and obtain review later; no reasonable expectation of being subjected to same 2013–2014 action	Exception did not apply: the motion sought relief only for the past school year and there was no reasonable expectation of being subjected to that same action again

Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2013) (describing scope of Arkansas 2013 Act exemptions)
Ind. Party of Richmond Cnty. v. Graham, 413 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 2005) (statutory jurisdiction does not dispense with Article III mootness requirement)
ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2004) (appeal must be dismissed if events during appeal make effective relief impossible)
Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992) (explaining mootness and advisory-opinion bar)
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (articulating "capable of repetition, yet evading review" test)
Van Wie v. Pataki, 267 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2001) (elements of the repetition/evading-review exception)
Brooks v. Georgia State Bd. of Elections, 59 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 1995) (appeal of preliminary injunction is moot when effective period has passed)
Bacon v. Neer, 631 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2011) (appeal of denial of preliminary injunction becomes moot if the act sought to be enjoined has occurred)
Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Livingston, 30 F.3d 96 (8th Cir. 1994) (preliminary-injunction appeal moot when the limited restraint period has expired)
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Gen'l Dev. Corp., 28 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 1994) (no meaningful relief when injunction expired by its own terms)
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (Article III requires a definite, concrete controversy to grant specific relief)