HEART 6 RANCH, LLC v. ZINKE
1:17-cv-02711
D.D.C.Jan 4, 2018Background
- In 2013 NPS solicited competitive bids for oversnow vehicle (OSV) contracts at Yellowstone; Heart 6 Ranch (Plaintiff) bid on south-entrance contracts but received none.
- DTRS Jackson Hole (Four Seasons) was awarded a south-entrance contract allocating two daily transportation events; Four Seasons cancelled that contract in Oct. 2014.
- NPS left those two transportation events unused for two seasons, then in Oct. 2016 reallocated them experimentally via a lottery to existing concessioners (one to a south-entrance contract, one to a west-entrance contract) and required specific shuttle uses (e.g., to Old Faithful).
- Plaintiff sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) on Dec. 20, 2017 and moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking, among other relief, that NPS be ordered to award Plaintiff the replaced contract or to conduct a proper selection process permitting Plaintiff to compete.
- Defendants argued no new contract was awarded and the reallocations were permissible contract amendments or adjustments under NPS regulations and the Centennial Act; Plaintiff argued the reallocations were a material change requiring a new public solicitation.
- The Court denied the TRO, finding Plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm; balance of equities and public interest were neutral.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Availability of judicial review/standing | Plaintiff lost a procurement opportunity and thus has standing to challenge reallocations | Defendants said no final agency action and decisions were discretionary NPS matters | Court: Plaintiff has a substantial likelihood of standing and the allocation is reviewable for now |
| Whether reallocation required a new public solicitation | Reallocation of events (including new shuttle use and moving an event to West entrance) was a "material" change requiring public solicitation | Reallocation was a minor adjustment/amendment permitted by regulations and Centennial Act; no new contract was awarded | Court: At TRO stage, Plaintiff not likely to succeed on showing the change was material; record insufficient to show illegality |
| Appropriate remedy if reallocations were unlawful | Plaintiff sought immediate award of a replacement concession contract to Plaintiff or an order forcing a new selection process with Plaintiff allowed to compete | Defendants argued even if flawed, automatic award to Plaintiff is not warranted and other unsuccessful bidders exist; remedy complex | Court: Plaintiff failed to show entitlement to automatic award; remedy speculative and Plaintiff not shown likely to obtain contract |
| Irreparable harm supporting emergency relief | Loss of revenue and loss of incumbent/preferred-offeror status are irreparable | Economic loss is not irreparable absent special circumstances; harms speculative and remediable later | Court: Plaintiff did not show certain, great, or irreparable harm; delay in seeking relief undermined urgency |
Key Cases Cited
- Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (preliminary injunction requires clear showing on four Winter factors)
- Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standards for preliminary injunction; likelihood of success and irreparable harm required)
- Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (preliminary injunction is extraordinary and drastic)
- Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (articulation of four-factor injunction test)
- Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (sliding-scale approach to injunction factors and economic harm not usually irreparable)
- Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (standing threshold for preliminary injunction)
- Nat’l Mall Tours of Washington, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 862 F.3d 35 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (bidder’s injury to fair procurement process is cognizable injury)
- Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (presumption of validity for agency action)
