Heard v. State
295 Ga. 559
| Ga. | 2014Background
- Victim Robert Ledbetter was shot three times in the head in Appellant Derrick Heard’s home on August 11, 2003; his remains were burned and later found; physical evidence (blood, bullets) linked the scene and a gun registered to Heard’s ex-wife to the killing.
- Farlandis Dillard, who stayed temporarily at Heard’s home and left on the night of the killing, testified he saw Heard shoot Ledbetter, helped dispose of the body under duress, and later told others what he saw.
- Heard was first arrested and indicted in 2003; the indictment was nolle prossed in May 2005. After investigators later identified and located Dillard, Heard was re-arrested and re-indicted in October–November 2009; trial began June 7, 2010.
- Jury convicted Heard of malice murder; he was sentenced to life. Post-trial, Heard litigated claims including a speedy-trial violation, Batson challenges to two peremptory strikes, and exclusion of evidence about the victim’s character.
- The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed: the evidence sufficed for conviction; no Sixth Amendment speedy-trial violation; no Batson error; and exclusion of the proffered victim-character evidence was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of the evidence | Evidence insufficient to prove malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt | Witness testimony, physical and forensic evidence support conviction | Affirmed: evidence sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia standard |
| Speedy-trial violation (delay between 2009 indictment and 2010 trial; and prior delays) | State’s delay (investigative negligence) violated Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial; move to dismiss second indictment | State: interval when charges were nol-prossed is not counted; later delay attributable largely to locating critical witness (Dillard); no deliberate delay | Affirmed: court properly limited inquiry to periods when charges pending; Barker/Doggett factors weigh against defendant; no speedy-trial violation |
| Batson challenge to two peremptory strikes (Jurors #8, #18) | Strikes were racially motivated | Prosecution gave race-neutral reasons (juror inattention/demeanor; juror conversing about police) | Affirmed: prosecution offered facially race-neutral reasons; trial court’s credibility finding not clearly erroneous |
| Exclusion of evidence that victim consorted with strippers (impeach motive to implicate Dillard) | Evidence showed alternate suspect (Dillard) had motive—should be admitted | Evidence only raised bare suspicion; did not directly connect another person to the corpus delicti or show recent similar crimes | Affirmed: exclusion proper because proffered evidence would only create conjectural inference and not reasonably show defendant’s innocence or link another to the murder |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (framework for Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claims)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (speedy-trial prejudice/presumptive-prejudice discussion)
- United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (Speedy Trial Clause does not apply when charges are dismissed in good faith)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prohibition on race-based peremptory strikes)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (demeanor-based, facially race-neutral justifications at Batson step two)
- Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (prima facie showing requirements at Batson step one)
- Curry v. State, 291 Ga. 446 (standards for admitting evidence implicating another person)
- Toomer v. State, 292 Ga. 49 (Batson framework and Georgia application)
- Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763 (trial court discretion in excluding victim-character evidence)