Haynes v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 3d 816

Background

Stacy M. Haynes was convicted in 1996 of multiple Hobbs Act robberies (18 U.S.C. § 1951), interstate travel in aid of racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1952), and six counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using/carrying a firearm in relation to crimes of violence; he received concurrent mandatory life sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1) plus consecutive § 924(c) terms.
Haynes filed an initial § 2255 in 2000; he filed a later, successive § 2255 after Johnson (2015) and Welch (2016), and then an amended successive § 2255 that the Court accepted despite no formal leave or government consent.
He raised: (1) an actual-innocence claim to the § 1952 convictions (not authorized by the Seventh Circuit); (2) that his prior Illinois residential burglaries relied on § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii)’s residual clause (alleged void for vagueness post-Johnson); and (3) that his § 924(c) convictions fail under Johnson/Cardena because certain predicate offenses do not qualify as "crimes of violence."
The Government conceded the parallelity between § 3559’s residual clause language and other residual clauses struck down post-Johnson and did not meaningfully oppose relief on that ground.
The jury instructions and the interplay between Hobbs Act robbery’s “fear of injury” language and the elements clause for § 924(c) were central to resolving whether § 924(c) predicates remained valid.
The Court concluded the § 3559 enhancement must be vacated and Haynes resentenced; it dismissed the unauthorized actual-innocence claim but adjudicated Johnson-based challenges to the § 924(c) counts.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the amended successive § 2255 (with two new claims) was properly before the court	Haynes contended amendment should be allowed; counsel was appointed and justice favors allowing the amendment	Government argued the added claims were unauthorized because not pre-authorized by the Seventh Circuit	Court allowed the amended filing to proceed (excused lack of formal leave) but treated claims separately for authorization analysis
Whether Haynes’s stand-alone actual-innocence claim to § 1952 convictions is procedurally authorized	Haynes argued actual innocence permits relief	Government argued the Seventh Circuit did not authorize that claim in the successive petition	Court held the claim was unauthorized under AEDPA and dismissed it (no jurisdiction to reach it)
Whether § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii)’s residual-clause definition of “serious violent felony” is void for vagueness post-Johnson	Haynes argued residential burglaries only qualified via the residual clause and that clause is unconstitutionally vague	Government conceded the clause parallels other residual clauses found void and offered no meaningful opposition	Court followed circuit precedent and found the clause unconstitutionally vague; vacated the mandatory life enhancements and ordered resentencing
Whether Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause	Haynes argued Hobbs Act’s inclusion of "fear of injury" to property allows non-violent, non-physical-force predicates that do not satisfy § 924(c)(3)(A)	Government relied on Seventh Circuit authority that Hobbs Act robbery necessarily involves use or threat of force	Court followed Seventh Circuit in Anglin and held Hobbs Act robbery qualifies under the elements clause; § 924(c) convictions tied directly to Hobbs Act predicates remained valid
Whether § 924(c) convictions predicated on § 1952 (interstate travel in aid of racketeering) survive post-Johnson	Haynes argued § 1952’s use of a pre-Johnson § 16(b)-style definition could render the § 924(c) predicate broader than § 924(c)’s elements clause	Government argued the ultimate crime of violence alleged was Hobbs Act robbery, which satisfies the elements clause	Court held that because the underlying charged crime of violence was Hobbs Act robbery (which necessarily requires force per Anglin), the § 924(c) convictions predicated on § 1952 also remain valid
Whether procedural default bars Haynes’s Johnson-based § 924(c) challenges	Government argued Haynes defaulted by not raising the issues on direct appeal	Haynes argued novelty of Johnson excused default and he is actually innocent	Court found novelty of law excused cause for default, prejudice shown (severe sentences), so procedural default was excused and merits were reached

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held residual clause of ACCA void for vagueness)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson is retroactive on collateral review)
United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2016) (held § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2015) (interpreting pre-Johnson § 16(b) ambiguity)
United States v. Hurlburt, 835 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2016) (addressing Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause vagueness)
United States v. Anglin, 846 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2017) (held Hobbs Act robbery necessarily requires use or threat of force for § 924(c) purposes)
United States v. Williams, 790 F.3d 1059 (10th Cir. 2015) (explaining AEDPA limits courts’ use of common-law miscarriage-of-justice exception)
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013) (discussed actual-innocence gateway to overcome procedural bars)