Hayes v. Crawford
317 Ga. App. 75
Ga. Ct. App.2012Background
- Hayes and Henson filed a wrongful-death action against Crawford and others after Sisson's truck crossed the center line and struck the father’s vehicle, killing him.
- Sisson pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide in the second degree, following too closely, and failure to maintain lane; plaintiffs secured dismissal of Sisson and his insurer.
- Crawford, driving in front of Sisson, stopped behind a car waiting to turn left as the accident occurred on Highway 61.
- Evidence showed Crawford had a potentially clear view of the stopped car, could have stopped safely, but slammed on brakes after incorrectly assuming the car was moving.
- Sisson’s following-too-closely plea provided prima facie negligence; the record supported plaintiffs’ claim that Crawford may have negligently failed to keep a proper lookout and caused a concurrent proximate cause.
- The trial court granted Crawford summary judgment; the appellate court held that genuine issues of material fact remained for jury resolution and reversed the judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Crawford negligent as a matter of fact? | Hayes argues Crawford failed to keep lookout and acted negligently. | Crawford asserts no negligence given his braking action. | Yes; reasonable minds could differ; issue for jury. |
| Was Crawford’s negligence a proximate cause of the collision? | Crawford’s negligent stop contributed to the crash. | Even with Crawford’s conduct, causation attributed to Sisson is possible. | Yes; jury could find Crawford’s negligence as a concurrent proximate cause. |
| Could Sisson be the sole proximate cause? | Sisson’s following-too-closely could be sole cause. | Evidence also supports Crawford’s negligence; not dispositive. | Record supports possible sole or concurrent cause; jury must decide. |
| Was summary judgment improper given the facts? | There were genuine issues of material fact for trial. | Material facts undisputed; Crawford entitled to judgment as a matter of law. | Judgment reversed; issues of fact for jury. |
Key Cases Cited
- Moore v. Pitt-DesMoines, Inc., 245 Ga. App. 676 (Ga. App. 2000) (drivers must exercise ordinary care and keep lookout; no assumption road is clear)
- Harrison v. Jenkins, 235 Ga. App. 665 (Ga. App. 1998) (unreasonably stopped vehicle can be a proximate cause when others are negligent)
- Vann v. Finley, 313 Ga. App. 153 (Ga. App. 2011) (proximate-cause principles with multiple negligent acts; concurrence allowed)
- Stern v. Wyatt, 140 Ga. App. 704 (Ga. App. 1976) (courts defer to jury on negligence and proximate-cause questions unless plain, palpable)
- Peacock v. Strickland, 198 Ga. App. 406 (Ga. App. 1991) (liability or negligence for driver who pleads guilty to related conduct remains for jury)