Hawk v. Hulett CA4/1
D077594
| Cal. Ct. App. | Jun 25, 2021Background
- Neighbors dispute: Hawk and Miller sued neighbor Jeffery Hulett alleging repeated harassment, stalking, trespass, photographing, leering (including alleged sexualized staring), and that Hulett filed multiple complaints with the City of Encinitas that caused emotional and financial harm.
- Respondents rented their house through Outsite; Hulett joined Outsite, viewed the listing, and filed code‑enforcement complaints (e.g., bedroom count, short‑term rental permits), some withdrawn or dismissed after investigation.
- Respondents alleged 11 causes of action, including civil harassment, civil stalking, trespass, IIED, negligent infliction of emotional distress, interference with contract/prospective economic relations, intrusion, wrongful use of administrative proceedings, and assault.
- Hulett moved under the anti‑SLAPP statute (§ 425.16) arguing his City complaints were protected petitioning activity and that all causes of action rested on that protected conduct; he also filed a demurrer and motion to strike.
- The superior court granted the anti‑SLAPP motion in part: it struck the entire 6th (intentional interference with contract) and 10th (wrongful use of administrative proceedings) causes of action as based wholly on protected complaints, and excised certain complaint‑related allegations; it denied the rest. Hulett appealed only the anti‑SLAPP ruling, arguing the court should have struck the entire complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Respondents) | Defendant's Argument (Hulett) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether filing complaints with the City is protected activity under the anti‑SLAPP statute and thus supports striking claims | Respondents: some City complaints were false and thus not protected; even if protected, those complaints were only incidental to broader harassment and torts | Hulett: his complaints are petitioning activity protected by § 425.16(e), and each cause of action arises primarily from those protected complaints | Court: the trial court correctly treated some complaint filings as protected and struck causes based solely on them (6th and 10th); appellate court affirmed limited striking, not entire complaint |
| Whether unprotected conduct (stalking, leering, trespass, photographing) alleged in the complaint is merely contextual or an independent basis for claims | Respondents: the “overall thrust” is harassment/stalking—complaints were incidental—so claims are not subject to anti‑SLAPP strike | Hulett: the boilerplate incorporation makes protected petitioning the real basis for all claims; unprotected allegations are mere context | Court: unprotected allegations provide independent bases for many causes; where claims rest on mixed protected/unprotected activity, the anti‑SLAPP motion may only target the protected parts |
| Whether plaintiffs must prove probability of success as to unprotected conduct at the anti‑SLAPP stage | Respondents: anti‑SLAPP should fail because claims are mixed and complaint filings are false | Hulett: plaintiffs must show probability of success for each challenged claim because all claims rest on protected acts | Court: plaintiffs need show probability of success only as to claims based on protected activity; allegations of unprotected conduct are disregarded for anti‑SLAPP step two and survive without the anti‑SLAPP court resolving their merits |
| Whether deficiencies addressed (or overruled) on demurrer can be relitigated via appeal of anti‑SLAPP order | Respondents: trial court’s demurrer rulings stand; anti‑SLAPP appeal cannot be used to attack demurrer determinations | Hulett: attacks sufficiency of allegations; seeks to have entire complaint struck on anti‑SLAPP grounds | Court: appellate review limited to anti‑SLAPP issues presented; demurrer rulings are not reviewable via this anti‑SLAPP appeal and Hulett cannot use anti‑SLAPP appeal to relitigate demurrer outcomes |
Key Cases Cited
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (2016) (framework for addressing mixed protected and unprotected allegations under anti‑SLAPP)
- Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (2006) (defendant need only make a prima facie showing that challenged acts fall within § 425.16)
- Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53 (2002) (describes the two‑step anti‑SLAPP analysis)
- Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com, 6 Cal.App.5th 602 (2016) (purpose and scope of anti‑SLAPP statute)
- Sheley v. Harrop, 9 Cal.App.5th 1147 (2017) (application of Baral to mixed‑conduct claims; plaintiffs must show probability only as to protected activity)
- San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.4th 893 (1996) (order overruling demurrer not directly appealable)
- Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 14 Cal.App.5th 574 (2017) (anti‑SLAPP motion may strike parts of a pleading as well as entire counts)