105 F. Supp. 3d 7
D.D.C.2015Background
- Hatter applied for a WMATA bus operator position in March 2010; offer was contingent on drug and medical exams.
- A physical showed elevated blood pressure and WMATA required a sleep apnea test, which Hatter took and which showed moderate sleep apnea; he refused to provide the test results to WMATA and was informed that refusal would disqualify him.
- WMATA hired another applicant by June 2010; Hatter timely filed an EEOC charge in 2010 alleging Rehabilitation Act discrimination.
- The EEOC issued a determination in July 2012 finding WMATA violated Section 504 by requiring an extra test and failing to hire Hatter; DOJ issued a right-to-sue notice in June 2014.
- Hatter sued WMATA in August 2014. WMATA moved to dismiss as time-barred, arguing a one-year statute of limitations (borrowed from the DCHRA) applied and that EEOC filing did not toll that period.
- The court found the DCHRA one-year limitations period applies and that its tolling provisions apply to Rehabilitation Act claims when the DCHRA is the borrowed analogue; because Hatter filed an EEOC charge within one year, the suit is timely and the motion to dismiss was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicable statute of limitations for Rehabilitation Act claim | DCHRA one-year period applies (parties agreed) | DCHRA one-year period applies | Court borrowed DCHRA one-year period |
| Whether tolling from EEOC/DCOHR applies when borrowing DCHRA | Hatter: EEOC charge (cross-filed with DCOHR) tolls the one-year period | WMATA: Court should borrow DCHRA limitations but not its tolling; EEOC filing does not toll | Court held that when DCHRA is borrowed, its tolling provisions apply and EEOC filing tolled the limitations period |
| Relevance of Supreme Court precedent (Johnson) on tolling | Hatter: Johnson does not bar borrowing tolling provisions; if borrowed state law has tolling, it applies | WMATA: Johnson supports that administrative pursuit does not toll claims that require no exhaustion | Court concluded Johnson supports borrowing tolling when the borrowed statute includes tolling; Johnson does not foreclose tolling here |
| Motion to dismiss as time-barred on the face of the complaint | Hatter: Complaint timely because of tolling | WMATA: Complaint filed >4 years after act, so untimely | Court denied dismissal; facts show tolling and timeliness |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard for plausibility)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility and pleading requirements)
- Cephas v. MVM, Inc., 520 F.3d 480 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (federal courts borrow state limitations when federal statute lacks one)
- North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29 (1995) (borrowing state statute of limitations for federal claims)
- Jaiyeola v. District of Columbia, 40 A.3d 356 (D.C. 2012) (D.C. Court of Appeals adopting DCHRA one-year limit as analogue for Rehabilitation Act claim)
- Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (discusses tolling and borrowing state limitations; limits of tolling where borrowed law lacks it)
- Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989) (when borrowing state limitations, associated tolling provisions apply)
- Adams v. District of Columbia, 740 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D.D.C. 2010) (discussed borrowing limitations and tolling; contrasted with cases applying tolling)