Haskins v. 7112 Columbia, Inc.
69 N.E.3d 1150
Ohio Ct. App.2016Background
- Minnie Haskins, a bedridden nursing-home resident (~300–400 lbs), suffered a femur fracture after two STNAs turned her to change bed linens on July 25, 2011.
- Plaintiff (originally David Haskins, later substituted by Crystal Haskins as co-administrator) sued the nursing home alleging the staff broke Minnie’s leg during the linen change.
- The nursing home moved for summary judgment arguing the claim is a "medical claim" under R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) and therefore barred by the one-year statute of limitations; plaintiff contended the claim was ordinary negligence (two-year statute).
- On remand from an earlier pleading-stage reversal, the parties submitted affidavits and depositions, including plaintiff’s expert Dr. Morgan and witness/STNA Kimberly Floyd.
- Evidence showed: (1) turning/repositioning and incontinence care were part of Minnie’s care plan, (2) STNAs have training and licensing and perform these interventions, and (3) plaintiff’s expert agreed turning was care-planned and part of nursing medical care.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant; the appellate court affirmed, holding the claim arose from medical/nursing care and was time-barred by the one-year statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the claim is a "medical claim" under R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) or ordinary negligence | Haskins: the linen change/turning was nursing (not "medical") care and thus a general negligence claim with a two-year statute | 7112 Columbia: turning/repositioning and incontinence care were part of the care plan/medical care, so the one-year medical-claims statute applies | Held: medical claim — turning was care-planned, ancillary and necessary to medical/nursing treatment; one-year limit applies |
| Whether care by STNAs or nurses can generate a medical claim | Haskins: care by nurses/STNAs is distinct from physician-ordered medical treatment; therefore not a medical claim | 7112 Columbia: statute covers claims against homes and their employees arising from medical diagnosis, care, or treatment regardless of caregiver title | Held: No distinction — claims against nursing-home employees arising from care/treatment can be medical claims |
| Whether the fracture was a separate, distinct negligent act outside of medical care | Haskins: the act of "throwing" the leg was a careless, distinct act not arising from medical treatment | 7112 Columbia: the maneuver was part of planned incontinence and repositioning care intended to prevent skin breakdown and alleviate discomfort | Held: Court accepted evidence that the maneuver was part of care-planned medical/nursing interventions, not a separate nonmedical act |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate given the evidence | Haskins: material factual disputes exist (expert saying it was careless, not medical) | 7112 Columbia: uncontroverted deposition and care-plan evidence show the intervention was medical care | Held: Summary judgment proper — no genuine issue of material fact that the claim arose from medical care and was time-barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Browning v. Burt, 66 Ohio St.3d 544 (Ohio 1993) (medical-claim definition requires the claim to arise out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment)
- Rome v. Flower Mem. Hosp., 70 Ohio St.3d 14 (Ohio 1994) (ancillary, necessary acts performed by hospital employees as part of ordered procedures can be medical claims)
- Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 (Ohio 2005) (de novo standard of review for summary judgment)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (Ohio 1996) (party moving for summary judgment bears initial burden to show absence of genuine issue of material fact)