Hartman v. State
156 A.3d 886
| Md. | 2017Background
- Hartman pleaded guilty in District Court to theft under $100 in exchange for the State’s recommendation of no executed jail time; both parties performed but the District Court imposed 30 days.
- Hartman timely filed a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court; in the circuit proceeding she pled not guilty and the State offered a new plea recommending 30 days incarceration.
- Hartman moved in circuit court to enforce the original District Court plea agreement; the circuit court denied the motion, holding a de novo trial begins anew and the District Court plea did not bind the parties on appeal.
- Hartman appealed; the Court of Special Appeals transferred the case to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed (1) whether a District Court plea agreement remains enforceable in a de novo circuit proceeding under contract and plea-agreement principles, and (2) whether the State’s new, harsher plea offer after Hartman’s appeal created a constitutional due-process (vindictiveness) problem.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a District Court plea agreement binds the parties after a de novo appeal to circuit court | Hartman: the original plea (State recommends no jail) should continue on de novo because plea bargains are construed by what defendant reasonably understood | State: plea was limited to District Court; de novo trial is a new proceeding so no continuing obligation | Court: plea agreement did not extend to de novo circuit proceeding; a reasonable defendant would not expect it to continue |
| Proper standard for reviewing whether a plea agreement was violated | Hartman: (implicitly) de novo review of application of plea terms to appeal context | State: de novo proceeding negates prior bargain | Court: whether a plea agreement was violated is a question of law reviewed de novo |
| Preservation and appellate review of due-process/vindictiveness claim | Hartman: enforcement needed on due-process grounds; also asserts vindictiveness claim | State: vindictiveness claim not preserved below; only contract/Santobello claim was raised | Court: Santobello-based enforcement claim was preserved; vindictiveness claim was not preserved but Court exercised discretion under Md. Rule 8-131(a) to address it |
| Whether the State’s harsher recommendation after appeal created a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness violating due process | Hartman: harsher recommendation deters appeals and poses realistic likelihood of vindictiveness | State: new recommendation was a negotiable plea offer; prosecutor free to change position pretrial; analogous to Bordenkircher/Goodwin | Court: no unconstitutional vindictiveness — pretrial plea offer is permissible because defendant was free to accept or reject; no presumption of vindictiveness warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Oku v. State, 433 Md. 582 (clarifies de novo trial is a "do over" for facts and guilt but does not automatically preserve plea terms)
- Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475 (whether plea agreement violated is question of law reviewed de novo)
- Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568 (plea bargains treated like contracts; interpret by reasonable lay understanding from plea colloquy)
- Solorzano v. State, 397 Md. 661 (ambiguities in plea agreements construed in favor of defendant; Santobello principles)
- Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (prosecutor may make harsher plea offer pretrial; no vindictiveness so long as plea is optional)
- Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (presumption of vindictiveness where prosecutor increases charge after defendant exercises right to appeal)
- Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (applies Blackledge presumption in similar context)
- United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (pretrial charging decisions do not automatically trigger presumption of vindictiveness)
- State v. Adams, 293 Md. 665 (Maryland precedent aligning with Goodwin on pretrial prosecutorial discretion)
- Rios v. State, 186 Md. App. 354 (contract/fair-play approach to formation and enforcement of plea agreements)
