208 Conn.App. 755
Conn. App. Ct.2021Background
- Phan, a Vietnamese probationary Hartford police officer hired in Dec. 2009, received mixed daily observation reports during his field training and probationary period.
- Two heated encounters with Sergeant Steven Kessler (Jan–Feb 2011) included explicitly disparaging, ancestry‑based remarks and a February 14 memorandum criticizing Phan’s competence and recommending retraining (not termination).
- Following the Kessler incidents, several other sergeants submitted negative reports; separate documented concerns existed about a lost hat piece, missing daily observation reports, and a June 4, 2011 Taser incident in which supervisors concluded Phan was initially untruthful about whether he heard orders.
- Chief Roberts terminated Phan on June 18, 2011, citing lack of truthfulness, poor attitude, and overall performance documented in contemporaneous memoranda.
- Phan filed a discrimination complaint claiming Kessler’s animus infected other supervisors and caused his termination; the CHRO referee and trial court sided with Phan, but the appellate court reversed for lack of substantial evidence of a causal link and pretext.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of ancestry discrimination (causal nexus between Kessler’s remarks and termination) | Kessler’s racist remarks and his memorandum poisoned other sergeants’ views, producing negative reports and leading to Roberts’ decision | Kessler was not a decisionmaker; no evidence Roberts saw Kessler’s memo; other supervisors testified they were not influenced by Kessler; negative reports and disciplinary concerns predated or were independent of Kessler | Reversed: no substantial evidence of a causal connection; prima facie fourth‑prong not satisfied |
| Whether "transferred intent" / cat’s paw liability makes the city liable for Kessler’s bias | Employer can be liable when biased subordinate’s input is filtered to the decisionmaker and induces the adverse action | Feliciano and later precedent require affirmative evidence of a causal link; transferred intent alone insufficient without evidence that biased input caused the decision | Theory rejected as applied here: no evidence Kessler’s input reached or influenced the chief’s termination decision |
| Whether the city’s stated, nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual | The timing of negative reports after Kessler and inconsistencies in city witnesses show pretext; credibility findings favored Phan | City’s reasons (dishonesty about hat, missing reports, Taser untruthfulness, attitude) are supported by contemporaneous documents and witness testimony; some issues predated Kessler | Held for city: record does not support that stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination |
| Standard of review—whether CHRO findings were supported by substantial evidence | CHRO and trial court invoked substantial‑evidence review in Phan’s favor | City argued the CHRO’s factual inferences were not reasonably supported by the whole record | Appellate court applied deferential substantial‑evidence standard and concluded the CHRO’s key factual inferences (causal nexus and pretext) lacked substantial support |
Key Cases Cited
- Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc., 316 Conn. 65 (Conn. 2015) (need affirmative evidence of causal connection between biased actor and employer’s adverse decision)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (U.S. 2011) (cat’s paw liability where biased subordinate’s actions cause adverse action)
- United Technologies Corp. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 72 Conn. App. 212 (Conn. App. 2002) (discussed transferred intent theory pre‑Staub)
- Board of Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 266 Conn. 492 (Conn. 2003) (substantial‑evidence review of CHRO factual findings)
- Rajaravivarma v. Board of Trustees for Connecticut State Univ. Sys., 862 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D. Conn. 2012) (analysis of when stray remarks show discriminatory motive)
- Azimi v. Jordan’s Meats, Inc., 456 F.3d 228 (1st Cir. 2006) (pretext requires specific facts showing employer’s reason is a sham)
