Harry Hamilton v. Nicole Bromley
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12252
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Harry Hamilton and ex-wife Sherrilyn Washington had an ongoing Pennsylvania custody dispute over their son S.H.; in November 2014 S.H. alleged abuse by Washington and was placed in custody-related proceedings.
- Centre County Children and Youth Services (CYS) placed S.H. in a group home (Youth Haven); CYS and Youth Haven restricted Hamilton’s contact with S.H. after concerns arose during visits.
- Hamilton sued in federal court (pro se) against CYS employees, Youth Haven, and Judge Lunsford seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged conspiracy to deprive him of contact with his son; a TRO was denied.
- While the federal case proceeded, state custody proceedings continued; a later state order (April 2015) vacated the prior emergency order and granted Hamilton physical custody of S.H., with restrictions on Washington’s contact.
- The district court dismissed Hamilton’s federal suit under Younger abstention without first resolving mootness; on appeal the Third Circuit found that the district court erred in sequencing but that Hamilton’s claims are moot and affirmed dismissal on that alternate ground.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether case is moot after Hamilton regained custody | Hamilton: not moot; capable-of-repetition yet evading review — reasonable expectation dispute will recur | Defendants: custody change removes live controversy; no exception applies | Held: Moot; capable-of-repetition exception inapplicable (no demonstrated reasonable expectation of recurrence) |
| Whether district court properly abstained under Younger | Hamilton: Younger abstention was improper; court should adjudicate federal claims | Defendants: Younger proper because of ongoing state proceedings implicating state interests and opportunity to raise federal claims | Held: Court cannot determine Younger absent Article III jurisdiction; district court erred in applying Younger test used, but error is moot because case lacks jurisdiction |
| Proper test for Younger abstention | Hamilton: N/A (focuses on merits and jurisdiction) | Defendants/district court applied Middlesex three-factor test | Held: District court misapplied precedent — Sprint narrows Younger to categories from NOPSI; Middlesex factors are not dispositive and are only relevant after identifying an applicable NOPSI category |
Key Cases Cited
- Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (federal courts must exercise jurisdiction only when granted)
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (establishing abstention doctrine for certain state proceedings)
- New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989) (identifying categories of proceedings covered by Younger)
- Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013) (clarifying and narrowing Younger applicability to NOPSI categories)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (jurisdictional questions are antecedent and mandatory)
- Winston by Winston v. Children & Youth Servs. of Delaware Cty., 948 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991) (capable-of-repetition exception in CYS custody context)
- Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690 (3d Cir. 1996) (mootness doctrine: developments that eliminate a plaintiff’s stake)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (requirements for capable-of-repetition exception)
- Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) (mere theoretical possibility insufficient for repetition exception)
- Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (courts must address Article III requirements before abstention)
- Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (jurisdictional prerequisites to abstention)