Harron v. Town of Franklin
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22029
1st Cir.2011Background
- Harron entered a 2007 lease of a tavern near Franklin Town Hall and sought to transfer Repsac’s liquor license to Harron.
- Town officials denied transfer/issuance of a liquor license; no hearing was held before the decision.
- Harron opened the tavern and served liquor without a license, with assurances from Town-associated parties that a license would follow.
- In mid-2007, Franklin Police conducted undercover investigations and a raid; negative publicity harmed the tavern’s business.
- The Town ultimately refused to transfer or issue a license; Harron learned Chief of Police Williams opposed the license.
- Harron filed suit in 2009 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town and several officials, seeking relief for alleged violations of Equal Protection and Due Process; district court dismissed the amended complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Harron states a §1983 due process claim. | Harron asserts deprivation of due process through license denial and the police crackdown. | Defendants argue No liberty/property interest in a license and actions not conscience-shocking. | Substantive due process claim fails; no conscience-shocking conduct established. |
| Whether Harron states a §1983 procedural due process claim. | Harron contends denial of license without hearing violated procedural due process. | No protected liberty/property interest in a license; hearing not required here. | Procedural due process claim fails—the license is not protected property interest. |
| Whether Harron states an equal protection claim. | Harron alleges selective treatment and discriminatory intent by Town officials. | Allegations of discrimination are conclusory and insufficient to show impermissible targeting. | Equal protection claim fails; insufficient comparators and malice allegations. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pagán v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16 (1st Cir.2006) (conscience-shocking standard for substantive due process)
- Martínez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54 (1st Cir.2010) (two-step approach not strictly required; shocks-conscience inquiry dominates)
- Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68 (1st Cir.1999) (conscience-shocking requisite for substantive due process)
- Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.1990) (requires egregious, brutal misuse of power for substantive due process)
- González-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir.2010) (distinguishes between conscience-shocking and legitimate government interests)
- Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.1992) (standing on what constitutes protected property rights in licenses)
- DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112 (1st Cir.2005) (due process applying to municipal actions)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard; reject bare conclusions)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility standard for pleading)
- Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2011) (pleading and plausibility in §1983 context)