Harris v. Mahone
340 Ga. App. 415
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Harris sued Mahone for negligence after a 2013 rear-end collision; trial occurred Oct 5–8, 2015 and a jury awarded $35,000.
- Pretrial: Mahone offered $15,000 (Sept. 8, 2015). Harris issued a written counteroffer for $22,000 on Sept. 11, 2015 and stated it would remain open 30 days as required by OCGA § 9-11-68.
- Harris moved for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68 after judgment, claiming the $35,000 verdict exceeded 125% of his $22,000 counteroffer.
- Mahone argued Harris never received written rejection of the counteroffer within 30 days and also submitted an affidavit asserting jurors told counsel the jury increased the award to account for Harris’s attorney fees.
- The trial court found Harris eligible under OCGA § 9-11-68 but held the counteroffer was not deemed rejected until Oct. 11, 2015 (30 days after Sept. 11), three days after the verdict; fees under § 9-11-68 are recoverable only from the date of rejection through entry of judgment, and Harris showed no fees incurred in that post-rejection window.
- The trial court denied Harris’s separate fee motion under OCGA § 9-15-14 (sanctions for frivolous defenses/conduct) and denied the motion to strike juror-hearsay; on appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed on § 9-11-68 but reversed and remanded as to § 9-15-14 because the trial court misstated counsel’s testimony about hours/fees attributable to the sanctionable hearsay issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entitlement to fees under OCGA § 9-11-68(b)(2) | Harris: his $35,000 judgment >125% of $22,000 counteroffer so he is entitled to fees for litigation from date of rejection through entry of judgment | Mahone: counteroffer was never rejected in writing before trial; offer remained open and only deemed rejected 30 days after offer, so Harris incurred no fees in the applicable period | Court: Affirmed — Harris was eligible but counteroffer was deemed rejected Oct. 11, 2015; no fees awarded because Harris failed to prove he incurred fees between rejection and entry of judgment |
| Proper construction of OCGA § 9-11-68(a)/(c) timing | Harris: statutory scheme yields an absurd result if counteroffers made <30 days before trial remain open past verdict; proceeding to trial should be treated as rejection | Mahone: statute is plain; only three ways an offer expires (withdrawal, written rejection, 30 days); cannot read trial commencement as rejection | Court: Affirmed plain-text construction; cannot rewrite statute or add a fourth method of rejection; no absurdity doctrine application here |
| Use of juror-hearsay in opposition and motion to strike | Harris: Mahone’s affidavit recounting juror statements was inadmissible under OCGA § 24-6-606 and hearsay; fees to strike were mandatory/appropriate under OCGA § 9-15-14(a)/(b) | Mahone: relied on juror-related affidavit in response; argued jury included fees in lump-sum award | Held: Trial court erred in denying § 9-15-14 relief based solely on a factual finding that counsel failed to allocate hours; appellate court reversed and remanded for reconsideration because counsel had testified to hours (~5) and $1,500 attributable to the hearsay issue |
| Need for proof of fees (amount & reasonableness) | Harris: presented counsel’s testimony about hours and fee amount attributable to the juror-hearsay issue | Mahone: challenged sufficiency | Held: For § 9-11-68 award, plaintiff must prove actual fees incurred and reasonableness; trial court correctly denied § 9-11-68 award because Harris failed to prove he incurred fees in the statutory period; but for § 9-15-14 the trial court must reassess because relevant testimony was given |
Key Cases Cited
- Brantley Land & Timber, LLC v. W & D Investments, Inc., 316 Ga. App. 277 (Ga. Ct. App.) (statutory interpretation is question of law reviewed de novo)
- Couch v. Georgia Dep’t of Corrections, 295 Ga. 469 (Ga.) (proof required for attorney-fee awards: hours, rates, reasonableness)
- Holcomb v. Long, 329 Ga. App. 515 (Ga. Ct. App.) (canons of construction; give statutory text plain meaning)
- Chase v. State, 285 Ga. (Ga.) (when statutory text is clear, courts must construe accordingly)
- Rank v. Rank, 287 Ga. 147 (Ga.) (attorneys’ statements in court may be treated as evidence when unobjected to)