Harris v. Commonwealth
2011 Ky. LEXIS 42
Ky.2011Background
- Indictments for kidnapping, first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse, first-degree wanton endangerment, and tampering with evidence; later indicted for second-degree PFO tied to same crimes.
- Trial conducted July 2009 before a special judge, retired Senior Judge Morris, assigned under Chief Justice power amid many vacancies.
- Harris was twenty at time of alleged crimes (Oct 7–8, 2007) and twenty-one at PFO indictment (Jan 2009).
- Challenge to the use of a retired judge presiding under Section 110(5)(b) and Sections 117–118 of Kentucky Constitution.
- Harris contends PFO conviction relied on misinterpretation of KRS 532.080(2) or unconstitutionality; court affirms both rulings.
- Judgment on counts including second-degree PFO affirmed, with sentence of 30 years total.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether retired-senior-judge presiding violated constitutional provisions | Harris argues appointment bypassed elected/gubernatorial appointment | Commonwealth argues Chief Justice properly assigned under Section 110(5)(b) | No violation; Judge Morris validly presided under Section 110(5)(b) |
| Whether PFO conviction properly relies on KRS 532.080(2) | Hayes should be overruled; age at crime should govern | Statute uses age at sentencing; Hayes correctly interpreted | Hayes interpretation maintained; statute not unconstitutional |
| Constitutionality of KRS 532.080(2) facially or as applied | Statute unconstitutional in light of Harris's age at crime | Not preserved for facial challenge; not unconstitutional as applied or facially | Statute not facially unconstitutional; not unconstitutionally applied |
Key Cases Cited
- Hayes v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 5 (Ky.1983) (age at sentencing governs PFO eligibility; plain-language interpretation upheld)
- Barker v. United States, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (speedy-trial concerns; pretrial delays context referenced)
- Rice v. Commonwealth, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 14 (Ky.1867) (de facto officer doctrine recognized for third-party validity)
- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (U.S. 1991) (deliberate sentencing policy considerations reserved to legislature)
- McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky.2010) (legislature defines penalties; court won’t redefine crimes)
- Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky.1996) (legislative interpretation persuasive when legislature does not amend)
- Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528 (Ky.2008) (mandatory notice in CR 24.03 preservation)
- Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 416 (Ky.App.1997) (objection to special judge not raised on appeal)
- Vandever v. Vandever, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 137 (Ky.1860) (historical de facto officer principle)
- Rice v. Commonwealth, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 14 (Ky.1867) (see above)