Harrell v. Hanson CA3
C078371
| Cal. Ct. App. | Sep 30, 2016Background
- Peter Harrell, acting general manager of Hornbrook Community Services District, filed a petition for writ of mandate against three District directors (Hanson, Brown, Barnes) alleging Brown Act violations, breach of fiduciary duties, failure to appoint/allow a general manager per Government Code and Water Code, interference with manager duties, and related torts and declaratory/injunctive relief.
- Defendants moved to strike under the anti‑SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16), arguing the petition arose from protected speech; they also sought fees.
- The trial court granted the anti‑SLAPP motion as to all claims except the Brown Act cause of action and awarded attorney fees; Harrell appealed.
- After Harrell filed a notice of appeal, the trial court entered an amended order specifying paragraphs stricken; Harrell filed a second appeal challenging that amended order.
- The Court of Appeal consolidated the appeals, held the amended order entered after the notice of appeal was void for lack of jurisdiction, and reversed the anti‑SLAPP ruling and fee award on the merits because the petition did not arise from protected activity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of first notice of appeal | Harrell provided adequate identification and designation of record to appeal anti‑SLAPP order | Notice defective for not naming appellant and not stating order date | Notice was sufficient under liberal construction rule; appeal allowed |
| Mootness (defendants left office) | Harrell: case remains justiciable; seeks damages and public‑interest relief | Defendants: appeal moot because they are no longer directors | Not moot: past damages survive and issues affect successors; public importance justifies review |
| Trial court jurisdiction to enter amended order after appeal filed | Harrell: trial court lost jurisdiction after notice of appeal; amended order void | Defendants: amended order clarified original ruling and was permissible | Amended order was void because appeal divested trial court of power to alter the appealed order; reversed |
| Applicability of anti‑SLAPP statute to Harrell's petition | Harrell: claims seek to compel compliance with statutes and bylaws; communications are evidentiary, not basis for liability | Defendants: petition arises from their speech and is subject to §425.16; no probability of success | Petition does not arise from protected speech; communications were evidence of statutory/bylaw violations, so anti‑SLAPP inapplicable; anti‑SLAPP ruling reversed |
| Attorney fees awarded under §425.16 | Harrell: fee award improper because anti‑SLAPP relief was wrongly granted | Defendants: entitled to fees because motion to strike was granted | Fee award reversed as it depended on erroneous anti‑SLAPP disposition |
Key Cases Cited
- Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera, 181 Cal.App.4th 1207 (2010) (communications that merely provide evidentiary support for statutory/mandate claims do not convert those claims into SLAPPs)
- Young v. Tri‑City Healthcare Dist., 210 Cal.App.4th 35 (2012) (mandamus petitions challenging government action are not necessarily subject to anti‑SLAPP when they seek to compel lawful governance rather than punish speech)
- Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, 35 Cal.4th 180 (2005) (proceedings after notice of appeal that alter appealed order are nullities)
- Madera County v. Gendron, 59 Cal.2d 798 (1963) (appellate courts may decide technically moot issues when the question affects successors and has public importance)
- Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (2002) (describes the two‑step anti‑SLAPP analysis and burden allocation)