Harper v. State
292 Ga. 557
| Ga. | 2013Background
- Indictment returned January 22, 2010 charging Harper, Chapman, and Pombert with RICO violations and multiple theft/attempted theft counts related to Glock, Inc. and related entities, with acts alleged through February 17, 2009.
- Harper, an attorney, was hired in 2000 by Glock entities to investigate alleged wrongdoing and recruited Chapman and Pombert to assist; alleged conspiracy to divert funds totaling over $3,000,000.
- Statutes of limitations at issue: five-year limit for RICO, four-year limit for theft/attempted theft, with tolling when the crime or victim is unknown; Glock over age 65 invoked tolling under OCGA 17-3-2.2.
- Trial court denied demurrers and motions; defendants sought interlocutory appeal; question whether tolling under 17-3-2.2 applied when the victim is a corporation rather than a person.
- Majority held OCGA 17-3-2.2 is constitutional and tolling applies only when the victim is a person 65 or older; corporations are not victims under the tolling statute.
- Remanded to determine, for counts where Glock was not shown to own the stolen property, the correct start of limitations, applying proper law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does OCGA 17-3-2.2 violate equal protection? | Glock victims over 65 receive extended tolling treatment. | Age-based tolling lacks rational basis and is overbroad. | Constitutional under rational basis review. |
| Does 17-3-2.2 tolling apply when the victim is a corporation, not a person? | Glock is victim; tolling should apply to counts involving its property. | Tolling requires a person 65+ as the victim; corporations are not protected. | Tolling does not apply to corporate victims; applies only to persons 65+. |
| Are Counts 2–11/7 barred by the statute of limitations given proper application of tolling? | Tolling may extend periods for counts involving 65+ victims. | Improper analysis below; need proper factual findings on when known. | Remanded for proper factual findings and application of the correct start date. |
| Did RICO count timing rely on proper accrual and tolling principles? | RICO acts within five-year window; tolling may extend. | State failed to show qualifying acts within time frame. | Court affirmed denial of the plea in bar for RICO acts; some acts supported timing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Higginbottom v. State, 290 Ga. 198 (2011) (knowledge of the perpetrator required for § 17-3-2(2) tolling)
- Royal v. State, 314 Ga. App. 20 (2012) (victim's knowledge perceived for tolling purposes)
- Womack v. State, 260 Ga. 21 (1990) (tolling concepts for unknown crime)
- Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 264 Ga. 701 (1994) (substantive latitude in classification for equal protection)
- Spurlin v. State, 222 Ga. 179 (1966) (indictment informs defendant of charges; timing not at issue here)
- Ingram v. State, 137 Ga. App. 412 (1976) (plea and sufficiency considerations under timing rules)
- Bell v. State, 276 Ga. 206 (2003) (thief cannot challenge title; indictment sufficiency considerations)
- Conzo, 293 Ga. App. 72 (2008) (statute of limitations analysis for RICO-like conduct)
- Jenkins v. State, 278 Ga. 598 (2004) (trial findings on disputed facts reviewed for abuse of discretion)