Harold Wayne Nichols v. Stanton Heidle, Warden, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15103

Background

Harold Wayne Nichols, convicted in Tennessee for a 1988–1989 series of rapes and the September 30, 1988 murder of Karen Pulley; he pled guilty at the Pulley trial and the jury recommended death.
Extensive mitigating evidence of childhood abuse, orphanage placement, and psychological evaluations was presented at sentencing; defense expert diagnosed intermittent explosive disorder.
Before the Pulley sentencing, the State had obtained several rape convictions (some later in time than the Pulley murder) and relied on those as statutory aggravators; some non-capital sentences were stayed pending completion of the capital process.
Post-conviction proceedings produced many additional mitigation witnesses and new expert reports; state courts denied relief and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Nichols pursued federal habeas under AEDPA raising claims including ineffective assistance at penalty phase, jury-instruction/unanimity and verdict-form errors, prosecutorial strategy in trial order and use of prior (not-yet-final) convictions, and disclosure/use of defense psychologist’s notes.
The district court denied habeas relief; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying AEDPA deference and reviewing unexhausted/defaulted claims as appropriate.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ineffective assistance of counsel at penalty phase (failure to investigate/call more mitigation witnesses)	Nichols: trial counsel inadequately investigated and presented mitigating evidence about his abusive childhood, creating prejudice under Strickland.	State: trial counsel made strategic choices after investigation; additional evidence was largely cumulative and would not have changed outcome.	Denied — state courts reasonably applied Strickland; additional mitigation was cumulative and no reasonable probability of different result.
Jury instruction regarding unanimity on mitigating factors	Nichols: instructions/verdict form improperly required unanimity for finding mitigating factors (Mills claim).	State: instructions required unanimity only for finding aggravators, weighing, and final verdict; mitigating factors need not be unanimously "found."	Denied — instructions did not require unanimity for mitigating factors; Mills inapplicable.
Jury verdict-form error, re‑instruction, and post-verdict polling (jury listed non-statutory factors, court sent them back to correct form and polled jurors)	Nichols: the verdict-form error and court’s correction/coercive polling invalidated verdict; judge effectively directed death sentence and curtailed mitigation consideration.	State: jury had already unanimously found statutory aggravators and death; error was clerical/misunderstanding; court properly clarified and re-polled; no coercion or prejudice.	Denied — Tennessee Supreme Court reasonably found initial verdict valid, correction proper, and polling permissible; no due-process violation.
Order of prosecutions and use of later convictions as "prior" violent felonies; non-final convictions used at sentencing	Nichols: prosecuting later-occurring crimes first manufactured prior convictions to qualify death sentence; some convictions were not "final" at sentencing so could not be used.	State: order of trials and the requirement is prior convictions (date of conviction), not date of offense; prosecutor discretion is broad; Tennessee law permits use of convictions entered before sentencing.	Denied — no Supreme Court rule requires chronological prosecution; Tennessee courts reasonably applied state law and federal precedent (McCleskey, Tuilaepa). Claim as to non-final convictions was procedurally defaulted; alternatively, not a federal violation.
Disclosure and use of defense psychologist Dr. Engum’s notes/impeachment	Nichols: forced disclosure and prosecutor’s use of notes to portray expert as advocate deprived him of fair trial.	State: notes were discoverable under state rules; impeachment by the State was proper and not so flagrant as to deny due process.	Denied — even if disclosure raised issues, prosecutor’s use of notes to impeach was not improper to a degree warranting habeas relief; evidence of aggravators was overwhelming.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference; "unreasonable application" standard)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (definition of "unreasonable application" under AEDPA)
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (jury unanimity misinstruction on mitigating factors can invalidate death sentence)
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (prosecutorial misconduct standard: whether comments so infected trial with unfairness as to deny due process)
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (once eligibility class is defined by statutory aggravators, jury may consider other factors in selecting who gets death)
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992) (vagueness of aggravating factors can violate Eighth Amendment)
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (prosecutorial discretion and high burden to show arbitrary death‑penalty administration)
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (states may permit sentencer to consider prior criminal activity; backward‑ and forward‑looking inquiries permissible)
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty constitutional framework requires individualized sentencing)
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death penalty imposition must not be arbitrary)