2020 IL App (1st) 200314
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- Allison Harned submitted a petition (the "Evanston Voter’s Initiative" or EVI) to place a voter-initiated ordinance process on Evanston’s March 17, 2020 ballot. The EVI referenced Article I §5, Article VII §§6(a),(f),(i),(m),11 of the Illinois Constitution and Article 28 of the Election Code.
- Three Evanston residents and registered voters filed an objection alleging (1) the EVI would present a binding referendum in violation of state law and (2) the ballot question would confuse voters.
- Harned moved to dismiss the objection petition, arguing the objectors failed to state their required „interest" under 10 ILCS 5/10-8. The Evanston Municipal Officers Electoral Board denied the motion (2–1).
- On the merits the board sustained both objections (2–1) and removed the EVI from the ballot, concluding it was not authorized by law and was insufficiently clear/self-executing.
- The circuit court affirmed the board; Harned appealed. The appellate court affirmed the board on both the denial of the motion to dismiss and the sustaining of the objections.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether objectors sufficiently stated their "interest" under 10 ILCS 5/10-8 | Harned: objectors failed to state their "interest" as required; dismissal required | Objectors: stating they are Evanston residents and registered voters and their objections shows the requisite interest | Court: board correctly found the face of the petition showed an interest; denial of dismissal not clearly erroneous |
| Whether the municipal electoral board may resolve legal/constitutional questions about referendum authority | Harned: such constitutional determinations are for courts, not the board | Board/objectors: board has initial jurisdiction to decide whether a proposed referendum is authorized by law/constitution | Court: board has authority to apply law/constitution in first instance when deciding ballot inclusion; de novo review of pure legal questions |
| Whether the EVI is authorized by Article VII §6(f) (form of government/officer clauses) or other constitutional/statutory sources | Harned: EVI is authorized under Article VII §6(f) and related provisions | Board/objectors: EVI does not "provide for" officers nor adopt/alter a form of government "provided by law"; §6(f) not implicated | Court: EVI does not change officer selection/terms; even if an alteration, it does not propose a form "provided by law" and thus is not authorized by §6(f) |
| Whether the EVI is sufficiently clear and self-executing (would it confuse voters) | Harned: proponents cited precedents where imperfect drafting was cured or acceptable | Board/objectors: EVI leaves essential implementation details (e.g., petition procedures, veto consequences) to future action and is vague | Court: applying Leck/Lipinski standards, the EVI is vague/non–self-executing and could confuse voters; sustaining objection was not clearly erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200 (2008) (standard of review for electoral board decisions: factual deference, de novo legal review, clearly erroneous for mixed questions)
- Jackson-Hicks v. East St. Louis Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 2015 IL 118929 (2015) (courts, not agencies, decide constitutionality though boards are initial fora for ballot challenges)
- Burns v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the Village of Elk Grove Village, 2020 IL 125714 (2020) (electoral boards must apply constitutional and statutory law when deciding referenda eligibility)
- Leck v. Michaelson, 111 Ill. 2d 523 (1986) (referenda must be sufficiently clear and self-executing; vague proposals invalid)
- Lipinski v. Chicago Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 114 Ill. 2d 95 (1986) (referenda lacking implementation detail that require supplementation are not self-executing)
- Johnson v. Ames, 2016 IL 121563 (2016) (applied Leck/Lipinski; simple term-limits referendum upheld where gaps could be reasonably inferred)
- Dunne v. County of Cook, 108 Ill. 2d 161 (1985) (alterations that change balance of powers constitute changes to a form of government under Article VII §6(f))
- Flowers v. Moline, 251 Ill. App. 3d 348 (1993) (a municipal ordinance can constitute a form of government "provided by law" under §6(f))
- Pochie v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 289 Ill. App. 3d 585 (1997) (whether an objector has standing is determined from the face of the objection petition)