delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiffs in this case are six registered voters of the village of Lansing, one of whom was also a candidate for the office of village trustee in April 1983. The named defendants were Ronald Michaelson, executive director of the State Board of Elections, Stanley Kusper, the chairman of the Cook County board of elections, and Louis La Mourie, the mayor of Lansing. The plaintiffs brought suit in the circuit court of Cook County to force these defendants to conduct a runoff election for two village trustee positions pursuant to a referendum and a subsequently enacted village ordinance requiring that a runoff be held for any village office for which no candidate receives 50% of the votes cast. The plaintiffs also askеd for their attorney fees. Defendant Michaelson challenged the constitutionality of the Lansing election system and of the referendum and ordinance by which the system was adopted.
The circuit court upheld the Lansing 50% rule and
In April 1979, the village оf Lansing held a referendum on the following proposition:
“Shall a run-off election be held for any candidates for public office in the Village of Lansing who do not receive fifty percent (50%) of the votes cast for that office.”
The proposition carried, and in July 1979, the village board passed an ordinance that it regarded as an implementation of the proposition. The ordinance, which took effect in September 1979, provides with respect to the office of villagе trustee:
“Section 4: In the event that all, or some of the candidates for the office of Village Trustee do not receive fifty (50) percent of the votes cast at the election for that office, then a run-off election will be conducted * * * as follows:
(a) If none of the candidates for Village Trustee receive fifty (50) percent of the votes cast at the election
(b) if one or more of the candidates for Village Trustee receives fifty (50) percent of the votes cast at the election for that office, any such candidate shall bе elected to the office of Trustee. If there are any candidates not elected, and if any offices for Trustee remain unfilled, then a run-off election will be conducted among the remaining candidates who receive the largest number of votes cast at the regular municipal election, not to exceed two (2) candidates for each office to be filled. The candidates receiving the highest number of votes in that election for the number of offices available shall be elected to the office of Trustee.”
The 1970 Illinois Constitution empowers home rule units to adopt or alter a form of government by referendum. Article VII provides in pertinent part:
“Sec. 6. Powers of Home Rule Units
(f) *** A home rule municipality shall have the power to prоvide for its officers, their manner of selection and terms of office only as approved by referendum or as otherwise authorized by law.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, sec. 6(f).
The referendum powers vested in the voters are limitations on the home rulе powers that are given to local governing bodies under article VII; section 6(a), which expressly excludes from the powers of local governing bodies the matters reserved for voter approval:
“Except as limited by this Section, a hоme rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs ***.” (Emphasis added.) Ill.
Thus, the constitutional mandate requires that changes in the manner of selecting officers of a home rule municipality or their tеrms are reserved to the voters by article VII, section 6(f), and can be effected only by referendum unless otherwise authorized by legislative enactment. It is clear that providing runoff elections for candidates for public office who do not rеceive the requisite number of votes is a change in the manner of selecting municipal officers, and in the absence of legislative authority for such a change, it can be accomplished only by referendum. It is undisputed in the present casе that the voters of Lansing had the power under section 6(f) to effect by referendum a rule requiring that their local officials be elected by 50% of the votes cast, and that such a referendum was required because there was no legislative authority for the change.
Defendant Michaelson argues that the requirement of referendum approval extends beyond the bare concept of a proposed change, such as the Lansing 50% rule, to the method of implementing that rule as well. Michaelson contends that the “approval” requirement bars any changes permitted' under section 6(f) that were not clearly contemplated by the terms of a referendum proposition. Because the Lansing proposition was not self-executing, and the ordinance that was passed to “implement” the proposition contained changes in the election system that were not clearly contemplated by the terms of the proposition, the defendants submit that the referendum and ordinance are constitutionally defective.
Among the changes in Lansing’s election system instituted by the ordinance that was passed by the village board to “implement” the referendum was the addition of a third election after the party primary in February and the general election in April. While the proposition
Adding a later runoff election necessarily shortened the terms of office of those trustees who are not elected until the runoff, and lengthened the terms of thosе lame-duck officials whose terms are extended until their successors are determined by the runoff. Altering the terms of office of village officials was not a change contemplated by the language of the referendum proposition, but is one of the items that is specifically subject to voter approval under section 6(f).
Moreover, the ordinance limits the number of runoff elections to be held to one per office to be filled, and restricts the number of candidates in eaсh runoff to the two receiving the highest number of votes for that office at the regular municipal election. (Ordinance sec. 4.) These limitations appear to conflict with the terms of the referendum proposition, which requires that “a run-off elеction be held for any candidates *** who do not receive fifty percent (50%) of the votes cast for that office.” (Emphasis added.) If a runoff slated all of the candidates for a given office who did not receive 50% of the vote, however, аn endless series of runoffs could result whenever more than two candidates ran for office.
The ordinance also declares that the candidate receiving “the highest number of votes” in a runoff shall be elected to the office of villagе trustee. (Ordinance sec. 4.) The ordinance thus permits candidates to win by a simple plurality where, for example, two trustee positions are at stake and three or more candidates are slated. This result is clearly contrary to the terms оf the referendum proposition, which requires every official to win by a majority.
Finally, how to determine what constitutes “50% of
Thus, the 1979 Lansing referendum was vague and ambiguous. Just what was approved by the voters is uncertain. Neither the 50% rule nor the mechanics of the runoff scheme were clear in the referendum. The referendum either proposed a series of runoffs or what it proposed is uncertain. What is clear is that the bare concept contained in the referendum proposition had to be interpreted, supplemented and modified in order to be implemented. Because the rеferendum could not stand on its own terms, however, the voters of Lansing cannot be said to have approved a coherent scheme for altering the election of their officials, which is what section 6(f) requires. Indeed, some of the specific terms contained in the ordinance that purportedly “implements” the referendum are contrary to the plain terms of the proposition.
The Lansing referendum illustrates the mischief that may result from a proposition that initiates a change in the election process without adequately working out and articulating the details оf the new scheme. Because we hold the Lansing referendum invalid, we need not reach the question of the validity of those provisions of the ordinance that conflict with State election law.
There remains only the question of the plaintiffs’ cross-petition for their attorney fees. Their request was made pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. sec. 1988 (1982)). However, that statute applies only to actions or proceedings brought under certain Federal statutes that are not at issue in this сase. Moreover, the plaintiffs have not prevailed. Hence, there is no basis for granting their request for attorney fees.
The judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are affirmed insofar as they denied attorney fees. The judgments are otherwise reversed.
Appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court affirmed in part and reversed in part.