Harnage v. Torres, 665 F. App'x 82

Plaintiff James A. Harnage, proceeding pro se, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal court in December 2015 against Connecticut prison and government officials for alleged misconduct dating to 2009 or earlier.
The district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A as time-barred by Connecticut’s three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577).
The district court found Harnage’s cause of action accrued no later than late 2009, when he knew of the injuries; Harnage had also filed a state-court action in 2010 based on the same conduct, which was dismissed on the merits.
Harnage argued on appeal that (1) his state-court filing tolled the federal limitations period; (2) the alleged wrongdoing constituted a continuing violation; and (3) he should have been given leave to amend his pro se complaint.
The Second Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, accepted nonconclusory factual allegations as true, and affirmed the district court, concluding the claims were time-barred and amendment would be futile.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Accrual / Statute of Limitations	Harnage contends his § 1983 claims are timely or tolled by subsequent events.	Claims accrued when plaintiff knew of the injury; three-year Connecticut limitations period applies and expired before filing.	Accrual occurred no later than late 2009; complaint filed Dec 2015 is time-barred.
Tolling by state-court action	Harnage argues filing a state suit in 2010 tolled the federal limitations period.	Connecticut tolling rules govern and do not toll § 52-577 for pendency of a state proceeding; savings statute inapplicable because state action was dismissed on the merits.	No tolling: state filing did not preserve federal claims; savings statute does not apply to merits dismissals.
Continuing violation doctrine	Harnage asserts the misconduct was ongoing, so accrual was delayed.	Defendants (and court) treat the alleged acts as discrete; accrual occurs when plaintiff knew or should have known.	Doctrine inapplicable: plaintiff’s claims accrued by 2009; continuing-violation exception does not save untimely claims.
Leave to amend pro se complaint	Harnage seeks leave to amend before dismissal.	District court may deny leave when amendment would be futile.	Denial of leave appropriate: no plausible non-futile amendment identified.

McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004) (standard of review for § 1915A sua sponte dismissal)
Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2014) (courts need not accept conclusory legal allegations)
Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1994) (Connecticut three-year limitations period governs § 1983 claims)
Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509 (2d Cir. 2013) (accrual when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury)
Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming sua sponte dismissal based on statute of limitations)
Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (federal courts borrow state tolling rules for § 1983 actions)
Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (U.S. 1980) (borrowing state limitations and tolling rules for § 1983)
Holt v. KMI-Cont’l, Inc., 95 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1996) (Connecticut savings statute applies only when original claim dismissed for procedural reasons)
Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2009) (pro se complaints and leave-to-amend standard; discussion of continuing violation doctrine)
Gonzalez v. Hasty, 802 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2015) (limits of continuing-violation doctrine and when limitations period begins)
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (U.S. 2002) (continuing-violation doctrine principles)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (leave to amend need not be granted when amendment would be futile)