Harmon v. City of Arlington
16 F.4th 1159
5th Cir.2021Background
- Arlington officers stopped O’Shea Terry for an expired tag; Officer Bau Tran arrived and told occupants to lower windows and shut off the engine.
- After initial compliance, Terry began raising the window and reaching for the ignition; Tran stepped onto the SUV’s running board, grabbed the passenger window, and ordered Terry to stop.
- When Terry started the SUV and shifted into drive with Tran on the running board, Tran drew and fired through the passenger window, firing five rounds and fatally wounding Terry.
- Terry’s estate and passenger Terrance Harmon sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force; the City was sued for Monell liability based on alleged failure to discipline and a biased-use-of-force custom.
- The district court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions on qualified immunity and municipal liability; the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding the force was not unconstitutional and no clearly established law negated qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tran’s use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment (excessive force / qualified immunity) | Tran used unconstitutional deadly force when he shot Terry as the SUV began to move | Tran reasonably believed he faced imminent serious harm while clinging to a moving SUV | Tran entitled to qualified immunity; use of force not excessive under the circumstances |
| Harmon’s individual excessive-force claim (bystander or seizure) | Harmon contends he was seized/dangered by Tran’s shooting of the driver and by the gun being fired near his face | Tran did not target Harmon; any alternative theory was not preserved; qualified immunity applies | Harmon’s bystander claim fails (no direct targeting); other theory waived and/or defeated by qualified immunity |
| Municipal liability (Monell) | City maintained a custom of excessive, racially biased force and failed to discipline Tran | Monell requires an underlying constitutional violation by a final policymaker or an official custom; no such predicate here | Municipal claims dismissed because plaintiffs failed to allege a predicate constitutional violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (reasonableness of force judged from officer’s split-second perspective)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (video evidence can control factual record when it blatantly contradicts pleading)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity two-step framework)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standards; disregard conclusory allegations)
- Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839 (deadly force permissible when officer reasonably believes suspect poses serious threat)
- Lytle v. Bexar County, 560 F.3d 404 (distinguishable precedent on shooting at fleeing vehicle at distance)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (limits on deadly force against fleeing suspects—narrow principle)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (need for closely analogous precedent in excessive-force cases)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (specificity required for clearly established law)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy or custom)