955 N.W.2d 336
S.D.2021Background:
- On June 9, 2016, Hamlin County law enforcement (Sheriff, SWAT, SRT, armored vehicles, drone) sought to arrest Gary Hamen on outstanding warrants; his parents (Gareth and Sharla Hamen) owned a nearby mobile home where Gary sometimes stayed.
- Officers established a perimeter, received conflicting sightings that Gary had left the trailer, and communicated with Gary by phone; no search warrant for the mobile home was obtained; consent to enter was not requested.
- To clear the mobile home, armored vehicles removed an unattached deck and rammed the front door and created multiple "communication portholes" by breaking windows and a sliding door, substantially damaging the structure and the septic system.
- Gary was apprehended later the same day near a river; the Hamens sued Hamlin County and the Sheriff for inverse condemnation under S.D. Const. art. VI §13 (damages clause) and for a §1983 Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment violation (unlawful entry and excessive force).
- The circuit court granted summary judgment to the County on the inverse condemnation claim (dismissed without prejudice) and denied summary judgment on the §1983 claims against the Sheriff; the South Dakota Supreme Court granted discretionary review.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether damage caused by law enforcement during the arrest is compensable under SD Const. art. VI, §13 (inverse condemnation) | Hamens: police exceeded legitimate police power; unreasonable damage to the trailer is compensable under the Constitution's damages clause | County/Sheriff: art. VI §13 applies only to public use/eminent domain, not to police-power actions; allowing recovery would circumvent sovereign immunity | Court: art. VI §13 does not apply to police-power damage; inverse condemnation claim dismissed with prejudice against County and Sheriff |
| Whether Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity for warrantless entry (§1983 unlawful-entry) | Hamens: entry lacked warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances; Payton/Steagald protect third-party residences | Sheriff: officers reasonably believed Gary was present or exigent circumstances existed; qualified immunity applies | Court: factual disputes (reasonable belief, timing, exigency) preclude resolving immunity on summary judgment; denial of summary judgment affirmed and claim remanded |
| Whether Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity for destruction of property (§1983 excessive-force) | Hamens: destruction to create portholes was unnecessary and excessive | Sheriff: force was reasonable under circumstances and law did not clearly establish that such destruction violated the Fourth Amendment | Court: no controlling precedent clearly established excessive-force violation under these facts; qualified immunity granted on excessive-force claim; summary judgment for Sheriff on that claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (warrantless entry to make a routine felony arrest presumptively unreasonable; arrest warrant may allow entry if suspect resides and is present)
- Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (entry into a third party's home to execute an arrest warrant requires a search warrant absent exigent circumstances)
- United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (destruction of property during a search may violate the Fourth Amendment when excessive)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (on summary judgment courts adopt the nonmovant’s version when assessing reasonableness; reasonableness can be legal question)
- Rupert v. City of Rapid City, 827 N.W.2d 55 (S.D. case: damages clause requires public use; inverse-condemnation framework)
- Eggleston v. Pierce County, 64 P.3d 618 (Wash. 2003) (denied takings recovery for police damage; distinguished eminent domain from police power)
- Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1995) (denied compensation under state constitution for police-caused damage during arrest)
- Kelley v. Story County Sheriff, 611 N.W.2d 475 (Iowa 2000) (permitted takings recovery in limited police-damage circumstances using a reasonableness test)
- Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991) (allowed recovery for police damage to property)
- Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980) (recognized compensation when police intentionally destroyed property to address a public emergency)
- D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (qualified immunity requires that unlawfulness be clearly established such that every reasonable official would understand conduct was unlawful)
- City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500 (in excessive-force context, existing precedent must squarely govern facts or the case must be an obvious one to overcome qualified immunity)