Haley Diana Forsyth v. State
2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 8381
| Tex. App. | 2014Background
- Haley Forsyth was arrested for DWI after failing a field sobriety test and admitted two prior DWI convictions; she refused breath or blood testing.
- Officer McDaniel transported Forsyth to a hospital and had her blood drawn without a warrant pursuant to Tex. Transp. Code § 724.012(b)(3)(B) (repeat-offender mandatory draw); result: BAC 0.18.
- McDaniel knew magistrates were available 24/7 at central booking (about the same distance as the hospital) but did not seek a warrant, citing policy and speed.
- Trial court denied Forsyth’s motion to suppress the blood evidence; she pled guilty and received deferred adjudication/community supervision.
- On appeal the Eleventh Court reviewed (post-McNeely) whether the warrantless mandatory blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment and whether implied consent or statutory mandate supplied an exception.
- The court concluded there were no exigent circumstances beyond natural dissipation, implied consent is not a substitute for voluntary consent, and the seizure was unconstitutional; judgment reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Forsyth) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw under the repeat-offender provision violated the Fourth Amendment | The blood draw was a warrantless seizure without exigent circumstances or valid consent | The draw was authorized by implied-consent statute §724.012(b)(3)(B) and thus lawful | Warrantless draw violated the Fourth Amendment; suppression required |
| Whether implied consent statutory scheme is an exception to the warrant requirement | Implied consent cannot validate a compelled draw after explicit refusal | Implied consent is irrevocable and supplies authority to take blood without warrant | Implied consent is not a recognized exception; voluntary consent rule controls |
| Whether mandatory blood draws are categorically reasonable under Fourth Amendment balancing | Mandatory draws are unreasonable without case-specific analysis | Statutory mandate and government interest in DUI enforcement justify per se reasonableness | Per se rules disallowed by McNeely; must assess totality of circumstances; statute not per se reasonable |
| Whether suppression is barred because officer acted under then-existing statutory authority/good-faith reliance | The constitutional violation requires suppression under Texas exclusionary rule | Officer reasonably relied on statutory mandate; evidence admissible despite McNeely | Good-faith reliance on statute is not an exception to Tex. exclusionary rule; suppression required |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (natural dissipation of alcohol is not a per se exigency; exigency assessed case-by-case)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood draws are significant bodily intrusions and, absent emergency, warrant generally required)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search must be voluntary; State bears burden to prove voluntariness)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent coerced by claim of lawful authority is not valid consent)
- Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (discusses implied-consent law; court’s comments regarded as dicta in this opinion)
- Forte v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (addressed implied-consent scope; recognized tension between statutory implication and voluntary consent requirement)
- Fienen v. State, 390 S.W.3d 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (reaffirmed that consent must be freely and voluntarily given for Fourth Amendment purposes)