Fienen, Casey Ray

Casey Ray FIENEN, Appellant Texas.

The STATE of No. PD-0119-12. Texas. Appeals of of Criminal

Nov. 30, 2013. Rehearing Jan. Denied

Melvyn Bruder, Dallas, Carson for Ap- pellant.

Benjamin Kaminar, I. Asst. Dist. Atty., Bonham, McMinn, Lisa C. State’s Attor- Austin, ney, for State.

OPINION

HERVEY, J., opinion delivered the KELLER, P.J., Court which and PRICE, KEASLER, COCHRAN, ALCALA, JJ., joined.

Appellant, Casey Ray Fienen, was ar (DWI). driving rested for while intoxicated When the trial court denied his pre-trial motion to suppress, Appellant pled guilty and was convicted of DWI. The Sixth Appeals Court of held that Appellant acted voluntarily when he submitted a breath specimen and thus affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence. Fienen v. 06-11-00087-CR, No. *3, 2011 WL Tex.App. LEXIS at *9 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2011) (mem. Oct. op., not designated publication). We affirm the court of appeals.

I. BACKGROUND 31, 2010, January On George Robinson County the Fannin Sheriffs Office stopped Appellant’s vehicle when he wit- nessed it cross the center line and drive on the improved shoulder. He contacted Tex- (DPS) Department as Safety of Public Of- ficer Carmen Barker to assist with the field sobriety Upon tests.1 Barker’s arriv- encounter, al throughout Appellant comfortably conversed familiarly with example, Barker. For Appellant asked area, Barker if particular she was from a and when she responded affirmatively, Ap- recording A1. DVD pretrial from Barker’s in-car cam- hearing Appellant's motion to era was made and suppress. admitted into evidence at search warrant. her that he execute blood pellant informed conversation, Overhearing very nice. also there it was Barker, my from “You take asked of his friends had told one my again?” I Barker re- arm or blow by her stopped previously been she tried to sponded, “No sir.” “When trooper. the highly he spoken had elaborate, interrupted by Appel- she was addition, informed Barker that Appellant stated, breathaly- a give you lant “If I who plates four titanium he had dentures and zer, in not the needle stuck getting I am to fight face due a on the left side explaining me.” Barker then continued year a less than before. that occurred had to Appellant because refused scene, And a vehicle drove when provide specimen, a breath blood “we Appellant shared with Barker he he county judge], meets us contact [the vehicle Red gone the driver of that to with he hospital, signs the blood search night before. Lobster warrant, your Appel- we blood.” take sobriety field administering After lant if be taken “even inquired blood would test, portable breathalyzer tests and a though against my religion?” it is Barker Appellant Barker showed believed stated, responded, “Yes.” “I’ll Appellant him for signs of intoxication and arrested give you my taking my You ain’t breath. arrest, Upon Appellant placed DWL blood, hate crazy. that’s I needles- in the trooper’s patrol Appellant vehicle. deathly I’m just terrified needles.” everything asked Barker if had been re- inquired Appellant Barker then if would corded, and when she answered affirma- sample. a prefer give Appellant to breath exclaimed, tively, “Alright. That’s he consented. if apologized He also he “was awesome.” dispatch called to cancel the re- Barker being way.” disrespectful in However, quest seconds judge. for copy with a provided Appellant Barker Appellant later withdrew consent and reit- statutory warning of the form and DWI erated, against my religion “It’s to See read the to him. my Consequently, blood drawn.” Barker TkaNsp. § 724.015.2 Barker then Code dispatch and asked them to call contacted asked if to Appellant willing he would the judge again. Ap- Barker asked When specimen, a breath or indicating a pellant sign form his refusal Appellant refused. asked, give specimen, Appellant a “If we in Appellant patrol While was seated go hospital, you’re really going to the vehicle, dispatch my Barker contacted awith hold me down and take blood?” Bark- ‘Yes, county judge er re- request responded, Appellant to contact the so that sir.” hospital sign plied, he meet them at the “Or I blow in the machine.” The could arrest, operate At will be Appellant's the time of Section cense to a motor vehicle automatically Transportation suspended, of the Texas re- or not 724.015 Code quired, part, prosecuted person subsequently is as arrest, a result of less than requesting person Before to submit to the a days;.... taking specimen, in- the officer shall require person orally writing The statute later amended also form the that: (1) warning person that "if to sub- person refuses if refuses submit to the taking specimen, taking specimen, may of a the officer of the that refusal mit to authorizing speci- subsequent may apply for a prosecu- be admissible in a tion; warrant person.” taken Act of men to be from the (2) Leg., ch. person May 82nd R.S. 674 2011 refuses to submit to the (West). taking specimen, person’s li- Tex. Sess. Law serv. 1627 responded, Appellant doing exactly she’s what her trooper job “Correct.” is and what about the of his earlier she’s hired do. then asked results him and Barker informed that Then, when advised the trial To not share information. she could court that he was objecting the basis of intentions, clarify Appellant’s Erdman v. 861 S.W.2d 890 asked, you specimen “Do want to Crim.App.1993), the trial court opined, your you go or do want Erdman, Well, says it give a hospital specimen your Appeals has explained that the focus of commented, blood?” “If I try on whether the alleged extra blood, a of it’s giving specimen refuse statutory language concerns the conse- probably to be assault or going like some- of quences refusing to take a breath nature, thing re- right?” of that Barker test. don’t in I think Erdman was it peated previous question. Appellant her about, you talking don’t take the breath me, replied, “I don’t want needle in but test, a going you. we’re to take blood from an Appellant this is awful.” After made talking It was more about the conse- inquiry quences happens unrelated about whether Barker of you what don’t individual, knew a he to take legally you. certain consented test to Sort test, to, breathalyzer you of what stating, get alluding you like were “Go your a lose license a getting period blower. I’m not needle in me.” for certain So, time and those Appellant apologized type things. also to I Barker exactly don’t know that on many point his mind The it’s changing so times. particular my ruling. case. That’s results that Appel- breath-test indicated lant was intoxicated. Appellant agreed plea subsequently to a bargain was sentenced to six months’ Appellant pre-trial sup- filed a motion to confinement, probated for a period press hearing evidence. At the on twelve months. suppress, motion Appellant argued to that be suppressed sulted in statutory warnings, and such nied the amounted ... results n ^[1] motion, reasoning, to apparent me that Appellant psychological pressure coercion. The trial because Barker breathalyzer warnings gave test should court extra- that de- re- Erdman made did not On direct II. SIXTH COURT voluntarily specimen. Barker at to *1-2, appeal, Appellant argue were coercive and that consent to that Fienen, OF APPEALS Tex.App. the statements providing 2011 WL relied LEXIS he a you “will me the one that said hold *4. The Appeals at Sixth Court of down and stick a needle me?” [Bark- disagreed judgment and affirmed just answering question. that er’s] the trial court. statutory going beyond She’s not that appeals court determined him, saying you “if the lesson from Erdman was that law going don’t take a breath we’re may give any warnings enforcement not you hold down and take blood out statute, that not in held but it you.” *3-4, in this case. Id. applicable was not [Appellant] Tex.App. The fact that her 8205 at heard LEXIS *9-11. The call explained Appellant in the court request [Barker] [for search that blood], non-statutory consequences warrant draw and the call and advised of request judge might for the to meet from provide means result his refusal Rather, automatically suspended), warning initial Appellant’s upon specimen. consequence {e.g., refusal ob- refusal, out nec other simply carried blood) was im- and later a warrant to draw job, taining her essary steps fulfill Further, according Appellant, fairly accurately proper. con responded were in- if the statements at issue Addition even by Appellant. initiated versation exists, infor it that the in the statute as now pointed court out cluded ally, the warning. very was the Barker did not the exact given to Appellant mation added claims Barker said that she information has since Transp. going get warrant and statute. See Tex. Code 724.015(3). forcibly body, the court believed would be taken from Finally, § exchange couching her statements absolute recording video thus that the (“may”) than permissive reflected terms rather Barker and between though even of the current statute. See professional, Barker was terms Transp. 724.015(3). interrupted questioned repeatedly Code ap the court of Appellant. Accordingly, responds State that Barker’s state- the trial court peals did not believe that obtaining a warrant did not ments about admitting its abused discretion a at all. The State warning constitute Fienen, 2011 breath-sample evidence. it argues that after 4916618, *4, Tex.App. at 2011 LEXIS WL provide specimen to that Barker refused a 8205, *11. at pro- dispatch and initiated the contacted warrant, a cess to obtain search a for granted Appellant’s petition dis We has al- made after the refusal statement cretionary review determine whether occurred, definition, cannot be a ready in conclud of erred Appeals “[t]he refusing. warning consequences ing [Appellant] voluntarily provided a following of his breath arrest specimen Additionally, the State avers that DWI, contrary holdings Erd of a search warrant is not an extra- pursuit Hall, Erdman, man, 861 Sells.” See statutory consequence refusing a 890; State, Hall 649 S.W.2d 627 S.W.2d v. sample or blood under Erdman. breath Sells, (Tex.Crim.App.1983); State v. 798 consequences The State claims that 1990, pet.) (Tex.App.-Austin S.W.2d 865 progeny its contemplated Erdman and curiam). (per nature, punitive are all of a and Barker’s warning obtaining about a warrant was THE III. ARGUMENTS OF PARTIES measure punitive neither an additional nor inherently prohibited “threat” an coercive speci- argues that the breath by Erdman. voluntary provided men he was not disposition controls IV. ANALYSIS because this case Barker’s Any person obtain who is arrested for she would a search warrant and given to have consent unquestionably impacted blood his DWI is deemed draw Ap- specimen a for a sample. providing to submit a submit decision purpose or blood for the implied-consent contends that the test pellant determining concentration or the in effect at the time of his arrest alcohol statute substance, drug, a presence that he of two conse- controlled required be warned drug, or specimen dangerous a other substance. quences refusing 724.011(a). However, Transp. (that § against the refusal be used him can Code right (subject an person license will retains absolute at trial and his drivers

333 here) certain not relevant determine whether exceptions given consent was vol (cit Meekins, untarily. refuse a test. Id. 724.013. That refusal 340 at 459 S.W.3d Schneckloth, strictly McCambridge 233, must be honored. 412 ing 93 U.S. S.Ct. (Tex. 499, State, 2041); v. 504 n. State, 712 S.W.2d 16 549, Harrison v. 205 S.W.3d State, 606 Crim.App.1986); Turpin v. (Tex.Crim.App.2006). 552 “The trial judge 907, (Tex.Crim.App.1980). S.W.2d 913-14 sifting must conduct careful and balanc explained apparent We have inconsis ing unique facts and circumstances “ law, tency: being implied by ‘[C]onsent in deciding particu each case driver, may legally driver refuse. A lar voluntary consent search was or however, submit, physically can refuse to Meekins, coerced.” 340 S.W.3d at 459. law, and the implied recognizing it Accordingly, follows because the reality, practical forbids the use fact finder consider all of the evi ” physical compel force to submission.’ presented, dence no one or statement ac State, 128, Forte v. S.W.2d 759 138 tion should automatically amount coer Crim.App.1988) State v. (quoting Spencer, cion such that involuntary consent is —it (1988)), 305 over Or. 750 P.2d 153 totality. must be considered in the by McCambridge ruled on other grounds appeals’s analysis The court of centered (Tex.Crim.App. S.W.2d Erdman, on the relation of this case to 1989). Erdman, S.W.2d 890. a DPS officer (a A driver’s consent to a appellant gave suspect) DWI voluntary, breath be free test must and warnings statutory they as existed at the and it the result or physical must not be of time. The officer the appellant also told psychological pressures brought to bear if he refused breath State, law enforcement. Meekins v. 340 sample, charges DWI be would filed 454, S.W.3d 458-59 (Tex.Crim.App.2011); against placed him and he in jail would be Hall, see 649 S.W.2d 628. The ultimate night. that Id. at 891. officer further The question person’s is the has “will that if explained appellant took the intoxi capacity been overborne and his self- it, lyzer passed and would test he not be critically impaired” determination such charged night, with DWI that but he that his consent search must it, charged took it failed he and would Bustamonte, involuntary. Schneckloth v. night. appellant subsequent Id. The 218, 225-26, 2041, 412 93 36 U.S. S.Ct. test, to an ly intoxilyzer submitted and the (1973); Meekins, L.Ed.2d 854 340 S.W.3d trial court overruled the motion appellant’s totality at 459. the the We “review of suppress the results of that test because particular police-citizen circumstances of a not the officer’s statements were coercive. point interaction from of view the the But, Id. at appeal, 891-92. Court Meekins, person.” objectively reasonable disagreed. 340 validity S.W.3d at of an 459. Initially, the Erdman noted that Court fact, alleged question consent is that a provided person the statute effect the State prove voluntary must consent warned arrested for DWI “must be convincing clear and v. evidence. State consequences only two—will specific two — Weaver, (Tex.Crim. 521, 349 S.W.3d 526 from a definitely directly result refus- App.2011). al to a breath Id. at 893 to submit test.” added). Then, (emphasis turning a consent to the analysis

Critical to hand, that the to we that “[t]he fact finder must consider the case at determined tality non-statutory conveyed ap- circumstances in order information

334 (that presented at jailed regarded other evidence he would be pellant As D.W.I.) suppress. hearing on motion type charged with was originally highlighted, evidence dissent psy- normally result in considerable would supported introduced the trial was suspect upon a D.W.I. chological pressure finding appellant’s court’s that the sam- taking to the of breath to consent voluntary including the fact that the was appellant Id. at Because ple.” on whether appellant vacillating was extra-statutory those conse- warned of the officer intoxilyzer submit to “[g]iven complete absence quences and procedure followed the that he same showing evidence that this record suspects, used with other DWI non-statutory given appel- information being Id. at 897-98 officer truthful. on his decision to bearing lant had no (Overstreet, J., dissenting). consent,” appellant’s we held that the con- of Erdman n confused voluntary. empha- Id. We consequence sent was As a progeny reasoning, and flawed its has fo sized alleged extra-statu cused on whether the enforcement officials take [L]aw consequences tory concerned suspects correctly care to warn D.W.I. (or refusing to the breath test take actual, direct, conse- statutory about failing consequences passing or informa- quences Any of refusal. other test). cases, According to those suspects may conveyed tion D.W.I. extra-statutory about the statements con have the effect—either intended or unin- sequences passing failing or undermining tended —of their resolve test “are not the same coercive nature” effectively coercing them consent. consequences as statements about Id. refusing to take breath test. Gette longer holding This no finds the State, 145 (Tex.App.- S.W.3d reasoning persuasive. of Erdman pet.) (citing [1st Houston Dist.] application, In its the Erdman Court failed Ness v. SW.3d surrounding to consider the circumstances 2004, ref'd)). pet. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] analyz- the DPS officer’s statements when Consequently, extra-statutory when the ing Consequently, voluntariness. it failed warnings consequences relate to the of analyze to the issue because vol- properly refusing specimen, the courts analyzed untariness of consent must be appeals of have that the statements held totality the of the circum- upon based inherently necessarily coercive are State, See Meeks 692 stances. v. S.W.2d and, the thereby, give rise to inference 504, Instead, (Tex.Crim.App.1985). 510 Id.; that the consent was coerced. Sando simply the the Court assumed that non- State, 792, 17 796 (Tex.App.- val v. S.W.3d statutory language regarding conveyed the ref'd). 2000, pet. Austin And such a consequences type of “was of the refusal situation, the have decided the courts normally that would result considerable accused need show a causal connection Erdman, pressure.” psychological 861 warning and improper between the the analysis at 894. fo- test, S.W.2d The Court’s decision to submit to the breath non-statutory on entirely instead, cused lan- present the State must evidence And in guage. finding that there was no voluntary. the consent in fact Sandoval, the non-statutory contrast, evidence that informa- 17 at 796. In S.W.3d conveyed about consequences tion the of extra-statutory when relate failing bearing appel- consequences refusal had “no on or passing [the of consent,” test, appeals dis- decision courts lant’s]

335 a causal required that the defendant show causal connection between the warning warning connection and the between decision to submit test. Urquhart decision to submit the test. This should not so—once be the defendant State, 701, (Tex.App.-El v. 128 S.W.3d 705 motion, has raised the issue in his ref'd); Dep’t Pub. pet. Paso proof State, on burden it does 823, 827 Safety Rolfe, v. 986 S.W.2d not shift back defendant. Sandoval, App.-Austin pet.); 17 Therefore, because of its flawed reason- S.W.3d at 796. ing and the flawed caselaw that has result- developed by These rules Erdman’s it, ed from overrule we Erdman. Law- contrary progeny are to the fundamental enforcement officers are prohibited from determining rules of whether consent was using physical or mental compulsion to voluntarily. Importantly, rendered these consent, obtain but by statements made rules, itself, analysis like the of Erdman officers suspects law-enforcement overlook the fact the voluntariness of analyzed be totality under the cir- analyzed upon consent must be based Moreover, cumstances. it is the State’s Meeks, totality of See the circumstances. prove voluntary burden to clear 692 S.W.2d at No 510. statement —wheth- convincing evidence. er it consequences refusing refers to the Turning us, to the case before test, a breath consequences passing will uphold we the trial finding court’s or failing a or otherwise— voluntariness it is clearly unless erroneous. should be analyzed isolation because its Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at When re 460. impact can when understood viewing ruling a trial court’s on motion surrounding circumstances are accounted evidence, suppress we “almost total words, for. other state- allowing deference a trial court’s determination ment itself control a voluntariness sup historical facts that the record analysis contradicts basic rule vol- ports especially when the trial court’s fact upon untariness is to be determined based findings are based an evaluation of case-specific all consideration of credibility and demeanor.” Guzman Meekins, evidence. See S.W.3d (Tex.Crim.App. S.W.2d Hence, non-statutory language does not 1997). questions We review de novo of law automatically amount to coercion create questions and “mixed fact” that law and an inference thereof. not depend upon credibility do and de Further, developed post-AW- the rules State, meanor. v. Montanez 195 S.W.3d man misapply proof the relevant burden of (Tex.Crim.App.2006). 106 Viewing in the addressing regarding con- totality the in the circumstances the sequences of or passing failing breathaly- a light most judge’s favorable to the trial zer test. It is well established when ruling, judge we that the did not conclude suppress, the issue is in a raised motion to his in finding Appel abuse discretion the State prove voluntary by consent voluntarily providing lant consented to a Weaver, convincing clear and evidence. sample. Contrary 349 at to this S.W.3d no- tion, placed of appeals courts a The comments at issue occurred burden on responded Appellant’s the defendant to show that he when Barker own coerced, was specifically questions,3 trooper that there was a and the did not response questions by Appellant’s 3. The fact that Barker’s were in does not comments 336 com- trooper with the Appel responded untrue as that the that was

any information inter- Appellant’s at issue. After hospital to the ments have been taken lant could intent ruptions expressed Al and to avoid obtained. search warrant and blood (and breathalyzer), hap take what would blood draw though conveyed Barker question clarify repeated Barker her suggested than pen more definite terms statute, a breath only Appellant wanted provided she by (present) going specimen. not or Barker was not information and blood the most basic did way exchange or exchange by explain prolong out of her linger prolong or pressure. Barker did obtaining psychological exert ing in detail the intricacies threats, deception, physical not {e.g., the blood search use or search warrant demanding or by touching, a neutral or tone of voice approved warrant must be supports magistrate language. recording and that video impartial and consistently was if that Barker’s demeanor judge may sign search warrant and noth- professional accommodating, it is supported proba he believes that cause). Furthermore, ing language about Barker’s comments or demeanor ble surrounding put psychological pressure Ap- was coercive when the undue not Further, pellant. Appellant’s expressed circumstances are considered. See John State, needles not the fact change 287 fear of does son S.W.2d a search (stating that “a consent to that Barker entitled seek Crim.App.1990) See, e.g., draw. response to a threat to warrant for given search TRansp. warrant Code 724.015. seek obtain search has voluntary”); Beaupre v. upheld as Therefore, totality of circum- under (Tex.Crim.App.1975) S.W.2d stances, convincing there is clear and evi- (“The that he going sheriffs statement dence that made conscious and to obtain a warrant to search the automo voluntary to the decision consent Beaupre’s render bile did not Mrs. subse were breathalyzer test. Barker’s actions quent for the search involun coercive, anything, Appellant not tary.”). to base greater information on which Appellant was could informed he his decision. fact, breathalyzer refuse he had done so at least two times before his Y. CONCLUSION Appellant’s initial Upon ultimate consent. refusal, following determining whether DWI sus- simply continued When voluntarily, look protocol contacting dispatch pects acted courts are to standard go hospital totality of the circumstances. Law- preparing may misrepresent obtain She did de- enforcement officers a search warrant. so law, they are spite interruptions by Appellant. required continued but neither repeat statutory warnings. call in the request simply heard Barker Here, Appellant voluntarily judge provided for and the mention a blood warrant, specimen following of his his arrest search so he was aware of breath only judgment It The of the court of general process to occur. DWI. began appeals when is affirmed. questioning response inquiry were in to an trooper’s itself render the statements non-co- comments See, Hall, (hold- however, is, e.g., ercive. S.W.2d 627 suspect). It a factor to con- ing that the evidence raised the issue of volun- sider. though the of consent even officer’s tariness actual, direct, JOHNSON, J., statutory consequences concurring filed information Any refusal. other conveyed opinion. D.W.I. suspects may have the effect— WOMACK, J., concurred. either intended or unintended —of under- mining their effectively resolve and coerc- MEYERS, J., not participating. Id. ing them to consent.” That holding J., JOHNSON, concurring filed a reflects that the Erdman Court was en- opinion. statute, forcing the as written and that the Court, I concur in the judgment two, two, statute authorized spe- disagree I with Court’s decision to but consequences cific “will definitely that overrule Erdman v. 861 S.W.2d 890 directly result from a refusal to submit to The (Tex.Crim.App.1993). majority ar Id. at 893. breath test:....” that, appeals because the courts of gues The Court also held that the extra-statu- in Erdman incorrectly ruling applied tory information was of the sort that would by Erdman 's developed —“ rules normally Paraphrased, be coercive. are the fundamental progeny contrary to Erdman, you told officer if take the test determining rules home, fail, pass, you you can but if go and “the voluntarily,” rendered rules de Or, you’ll go jail in the tonight. immor- veloped post-Erdman misapply the rele Dirty Harry, [you] tal words of “Do feel vant proof’ burden should —this lucky?” The arising outcome events Erdman. to me overrule It seems statutory warnings from the is known from of Erd generated by progeny rules refuse, moment they given you are —if man are the problem, we should be over refusal against you will be admissible ruling progeny, parent. not the in a court of law your license to drive suspended days. compar- will be for 90 In flawed, logic The is not al- ison, the outcome of events based on the though apparently misunderstood. The extra-statutory information is uncertain Erdman Court did consider the totality speculative you choose to take the circumstances; gave officer —if Erd- test, the will consequences not be known that man some information stated the law Certainty the test completed. until is correctly, but added statements about the is key understanding outcome consequences refusing or taking finding of as to the coerciveness instruc- test that not the were law. The issue in Erdman. at tions exclusively Court did not focus on the im- statements, permissible clearly case, and it ques- the officer answered placed proving the burden of voluntariness appellant ques- asked. As to his tions Id. holding state1. issue of tions affected the voluntari- ness, clearly: holding only procedures stated “We are she would clarified what law enforcement officials take care to used because he refused to take the had correctly test. were accurate suspects warn D.W.I. about the Her answers complete general proposition with the [it] 1. "Given the absence of record has a showing non-statutory evidence in- voluntary that this showing burden of consent to an given appellant bearing formation intoxilyzer assume without de- test.’ We will consent, on his decision to no rational factfin- therefore, 67011-5, ciding, Article that under der could conclude the State carried its showing the State the burden of has showing appellant's burden of voluntary consent to a test.” Id. at see, voluntary." But Id. at 894. footnote 893 n. 2. brief, forthrightly 'agrees 2: "In its the State procedures, and about those statements speculative outcomes.

she did discuss arrest, Throughout encounter on although appellant vacillated whether breath, sample of his the officer comported gave answers that with statutory Because all of the language. appellant’s questions

officer’s answers to bounds, I find statutory fell within would that no Erdman error occurred. Because occurred, this Erdman has error Court case, Erdman no cause to overrule law, nor, I under current argue would said, if the problem case. As I have interpretation appeals, problem that is the courts should addressed. judgment I concur the Court. parte Wayne Ex Michael McCann, Houston, TX, for Patrick F. NORRIS, Applicant. Wayne Norris. Michael WR-72,835-02. No. Wilson, Attorney, Asst. Roe District McMinn, Houston, Attor- Lisa C. State’s Appeals Criminal Texas. Austin, TX, ney, for State. 12, 2012. Dec. P.J.,

KELLER, delivered the order of the Court. capital mur-

Applicant was convicted killing der and sentenced death for baby.1 mother and her We affirmed his appeal.2 sentence on direct conviction and point his second of error direct appeal, applicant complained about instruc- submission of transferred intent tions contended jury charge in the 19.03(a); (Tex.Crim. 1. Tex. Penal Code 902 S.W.2d 428 Norris Crim. Tex.Code App.1995). Proc. art. 37.071.

Case Details

Case Name: Fienen, Casey Ray

Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Date Published: Nov 21, 2012

Citation: 390 S.W.3d 328

Docket Number: PD-0119-12

Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.