Hale v. King
624 F.3d 178
5th Cir.2011Background
- Hale, proceeding pro se, sues Mississippi and prison officials alleging denial of medical/psychiatric care under §1983 and ADA Title II.
- Title II claims target three MDOC/SMCI officials for classifying Hale as medical class III/psychiatric C and denying access to programs and facilities.
- District court dismissed §1983 and Title II claims sua sponte, finding no state-action violation and lack of cognizable Title II claim.
- Davis United States intervened, arguing Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity for constitutional violations and non-constitutional Title II conduct.
- Fifth Circuit vacated district court decision, granted panel rehearing, and remanded to allow Hale to amend Title II allegations; considered Georgia framework for abrogation and disability analysis.
- Court acknowledges Hale’s pre-ADAAA allegations; determines Hale failed to plead a qualifying disability under the ADA prior to ADAAA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Title II abrogation of sovereign immunity applies here | Hale contends Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity for disability discrimination by state prison officials. | Appellees and district court argue abrogation is not valid for conduct not violating the Fourteenth Amendment. | Remand required to determine Title II violation first; Georgia framework applied later if violation found. |
| Whether Hale stated a Title II claim against the Appellees | Hale alleges denial of access to programs due to disabilities and MDOC classifications. | Appellees deny discrimination or failure to state a claim under Title II as alleged. | Subject to remand; fifth circuit analyzes whether complaint plausibly states a Title II discrimination claim. |
| Whether Hale had a qualifying disability under the pre-ADAAA framework | Hale claims impairments (Hepatitis C, PTSD, back pain) substantially limit major life activities. | Alleged impairments do not substantially limit major life activities; not a disability under A or B. | Hale not shown to have a qualifying disability; dismissed as to Title II claim unless amended. |
| Whether Hale can amend and proceed on remand | Hale should be allowed to amend Title II allegations after Spears hearing. | Amendment rights follow standard pleading rules; district court should assess after remand. | Remand to permit amendment; not addressed on the merits pending amendment and Georgia framing. |
| Whether the court should address abrogation/ Fourteenth Amendment issues now | Immediate consideration of abrogation and constitutional issues is warranted. | Should not decide constitutional issues until a Title II violation is established. | Not reached; reserved pending amendment showing a valid Title II claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (U.S. 2006) (three-part Georgia framework for abrogation by Title II)
- Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 2007) (first-step Title II claim analysis per Georgia)
- Bu chanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158 (1st Cir. 2006) (state conduct analysis under Georgia approach)
- Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys. of Lafayette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610 (5th Cir. 2001) (defining disability and substantial limitation under ADA)
- Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2009) (ADA disability definitions and substantial limitation standard)
- Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985) (Spears hearing as mechanism to amend prisoner pleadings)
- Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (U.S. 2002) (explanation of 'substantially limits' major life activities)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard for plausibility under Rule 12(b)(6))