Hafiz Muhammad Khan v. United States
928 F.3d 1264
| 11th Cir. | 2019Background
- Hafiz Muhammad Sher Ali Khan, a U.S. citizen and imam, was convicted of providing material support to the Pakistani Taliban based primarily on recorded calls and financial records; he was tried after Rule 15 depositions were authorized to be taken in Pakistan via live video.
- The district court conditioned permission for Pakistani depositions on defense counsel Khurrum Wahid obtaining either explicit Pakistani approval or an acknowledgment that no permission was needed; Wahid traveled to Pakistan, consulted officials and a local lawyer, and reported ambiguity about whether formal permission could or would be granted.
- The district court allowed depositions to proceed without formal Pakistani approval; video conferencing worked for one witness (Ali Rehman) but then the connection was abruptly cut—likely by Pakistani authorities—preventing several defense witnesses from testifying live.
- Trial proceeded; Khan testified and was convicted. On appeal the convictions were affirmed. Khan later filed a §2255 motion claiming ineffective assistance because Wahid failed to obtain formal Pakistani approval as ordered.
- The district court denied relief, finding Wahid’s performance was not deficient (a reasonable strategic choice given diplomatic and logistical barriers) and Khan failed to show prejudice; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Khan's Argument | Government/Wahid's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s failure to obtain formal Pakistani approval for depositions is per se ineffective assistance | Failure to comply with the court’s instruction constituted per se deficient performance | Strickland forbids per se rules; counsel’s choice was a reasonable strategy given diplomatic uncertainty | Not per se ineffective; Strickland totality-of-circumstances applies |
| Whether Wahid’s conduct was objectively deficient under Strickland | Waived or ignored a court condition, breaching duty and amounting to ineffective assistance | Counsel reasonably investigated, faced unprecedented obstacles, and made a tactical choice to proceed without formal approval | Not deficient; decision was reasonable trial strategy |
| Whether Khan suffered prejudice from counsel’s decision | But for counsel’s failure to secure formal approval, witnesses would have testified and outcome would differ | No evidence formal approval would have been granted; evidence of guilt was overwhelming | No prejudice shown; §2255 relief denied |
| Whether breach of a duty to the court automatically implies ineffective assistance to client | Court-disobedience warrants relief independent of Strickland | Duty to court and duty to client are distinct; breach of court obligation does not automatically equal Strickland deficiency | Breach of duty to court does not by itself establish Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (rejects categorical rules inconsistent with Strickland’s totality-of-circumstances approach)
- Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (refuses bright-line rule on counsel’s duty to file notice of appeal; applies Strickland analysis)
- Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1983) (discusses representation by unlicensed practitioner and the scope of ‘counsel’)
- Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (addresses adequacy of representation by unlicensed practitioner)
- United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2010) (treats representation by unlicensed counsel and discusses perceived per se rules)
- Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejects per se ineffective-assistance rules in various contexts)
- Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (deference to reasonable trial strategy)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (total deprivation of counsel concept)
