Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142

Background

This appeal concerns whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) may apply its post hoc interpretation (In re Briones) retroactively to bar adjustment-of-status applications when earlier controlling Tenth Circuit precedent (Padilla‑Caldera I) permitted such relief.
Padilla‑Caldera I (10th Cir.) held the statutes at issue could be read to preserve Attorney General discretion to adjust status despite a ten‑year bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).
The BIA promulgated Briones adopting the opposite policy position; later the Tenth Circuit, construing Chevron and Brand X, upheld Briones in Padilla‑Caldera II and overruled Padilla‑Caldera I prospectively.
In De Niz Robles the Tenth Circuit held that when an agency overturns a judicial interpretation under Chevron/Brand X, that agency rule is an exercise of delegated legislative power and is presumptively prospective — the agency may not apply it retroactively to conduct completed while the prior judicial precedent remained controlling.
Gutierrez‑Brizuela applied for adjustment while Padilla‑Caldera I was still binding but after the BIA announced Briones and before this court’s Padilla‑Caldera II; the BIA sought to apply Briones to deny his application.
The panel (Gorsuch) grants review, reiterates De Niz Robles, and holds Briones was ineffective in the Tenth Circuit until this court performed its Chevron/Brand X review; retroactive application to Gutierrez‑Brizuela is barred on prospectivity, due process, and equal‑protection grounds and under Chenery/Stewart balancing factors.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
May BIA apply Briones retroactively to applications filed before this court adopted Briones in Padilla‑Caldera II?	Gutierrez‑Brizuela: No — he relied on controlling Tenth Circuit precedent (Padilla‑Caldera I); retroactive application violates reliance, due process, and equal protection.	BIA: Yes — Brand X requires that agency policy choices under Chevron be immediately enforceable, otherwise agencies could never displace prior judicial interpretations.	Held: No — Briones had no legal effect in this circuit until the court completed Chevron/Brand X review; agency cannot retroactively apply its new rule to conduct that occurred while contrary circuit precedent governed.
When an agency overrules judicial precedent via Chevron/Brand X, is the resultant rule legislative in nature and presumptively prospective?	Gutierrez‑Brizuela: Yes — such agency action functions as delegated legislative policymaking and should be treated like legislation (prospective by default).	BIA: Implicitly argues agency’s rule must be effective immediately to vindicate Brand X; downplays prospectivity presumption.	Held: Yes — the rule emanates from delegated legislative authority and is subject to the presumption of prospectivity absent clear congressional authorization for retroactivity.
Do due process and equal protection concerns—and Chenery/Stewart balancing—counsel against retroactive application here?	Gutierrez‑Brizuela: Yes — reliance interests, lack of fair notice, and risk of politicized punishment weigh strongly against retroactivity.	BIA: Benefits of immediate enforcement of agency policy outweigh reliance costs (agency must be able to disagree with courts).	Held: The balance favors petitioner — reliance and fair‑notice harms are substantial and the BIA identified no countervailing benefits sufficient to justify retroactivity.
Does Brand X force courts to give retroactive effect to agency interpretations overruling prior judicial decisions?	Gutierrez‑Brizuela: No — Brand X governs deference and prospective displacement of judicial precedent but does not eliminate prospectivity safeguards.	BIA: Brand X implies agencies must be able to apply Chevron step‑two decisions immediately or they could never displace prior judicial rulings.	Held: No — Brand X does not trump prospectivity; courts can and should give agency‑endorsed interpretations prospective effect while protecting reliance interests of parties who acted under prior precedent.

Key Cases Cited

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes)
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations even when they overturn prior judicial interpretations)
De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1144 (10th Cir. 2015) (agency rule effectivity tied to judicial adoption; prospective application presumption for agency overrulings under Chevron/Brand X)
Padilla‑Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2005) (Padilla‑Caldera I — Tenth Circuit interpretation permitting adjustment of status)
Padilla‑Caldera v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011) (Padilla‑Caldera II — court applied Chevron/Brand X and deferred to BIA’s contrary interpretation)
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (statutory grants of rulemaking authority are not presumed to authorize retroactive rules absent clear congressional intent)
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (presumption against retroactive application of statutes; factors for retroactivity analysis)
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (factors and framework for determining whether to give retroactive effect to agency decisions)
Stewart Capital Corp. v. Andrus, 701 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1983) (circuit formulation of Chenery retroactivity factors)
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) (reliance on judicial precedent and limits on overruling precedent)