Gurley v. Missouri Board of Private Investigator Examiners
2012 Mo. LEXIS 66
Mo.2012Background
- Gurley sought a Missouri private investigator license under 324.1100–324.1148; the Board denied but the AHC later ordered issuance.
- Gurley previously held a Columbia PI license (2010 renewal through Sept. 30, 2010) and operated his business while pursuing licensure.
- The 2007 statute created the Board of Private Investigator Examiners and criminalized unlicensed PI activity; the statute defines “private investigator business.”
- Gurley alleged the licensure scheme violated First Amendment free speech and due process rights; the circuit court dismissed these claims as moot or non-merit-based.
- The AHC order ultimately granted Gurley a license; Gurley then appeals to the Missouri Supreme Court under exclusive appellate jurisdiction for constitutional questions.
- The court concludes the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad when construed to apply to commercial investigations for profit or professional occupations; Gurley’s procedural due process claims are moot and the public-interest mootness exception does not apply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the private investigator statute is overbroad. | Gurley—overbreadth; broad reach to ordinary speech activities. | Gurley is outside the statute’s overbreadth scope when applied to commercial/private investigators. | Not unconstitutionally overbroad under narrowing construction. |
| Whether procedural due process claims are moot or viable. | Public interest exception to mootness justifies review. | No live controversy; public interest exception inapplicable. | Moot; public interest exception inapplicable. |
| How to construe “private investigator business” within the statute. | Definition lacks commercial element; includes broad First Amendment activities. | Word “business” limits scope to commercial/professional contexts. | Construction limited to commercial/private-investigator contexts; not unconstitutional on its face. |
Key Cases Cited
- Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d 732 (Mo. banc 2007) (statutory construction favors narrowing interpretation)
- Pollard v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 665 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. banc 1984) (gives guidance on overbreadth analysis and statutory construction)
- S. Metro. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Lee's Summit, 278 S.W.3d 659 (Mo. banc 2009) (statutory interpretation and constitutionality review guidance)
- Bullington v. State, 459 S.W.2d 334 (Mo.1970) (consideration of statutory interpretation in light of legislative intent)
- Killeron v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 733 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. banc 1987) (principles on proper statutory construction)
- Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3, — (—) (exclusive appellate jurisdiction for challenges to statutes or the constitution)