Gupta v. State, 452 Md. 103

Background

Defendant Rahul Gupta was arrested after his friend Mark Waugh was found stabbed to death; Gupta made spontaneous statements at the scene and later was interrogated by detectives for 55 minutes.
While detained in a holding cell before interrogation, Gupta twice–several times according to testimony–shouted “I want a lawyer”; an officer relayed this to detectives (one detective recalled being told; the other did not).
After approximately three hours, detectives placed Gupta in an interview room, read Miranda warnings, Gupta said he understood, then began answering questions and did not request counsel during the interrogation; he asked once mid-interview, "When do I get to talk ..." and was interrupted.
At trial a juror (Juror 18A) told the judge’s law clerk she had a scheduling conflict (a conference) that would prevent service later in the week; the clerk told the judge and the judge (through the clerk) told the juror off the record she could go to the conference; the parties were informed only later and given opportunities to comment before the juror was excused and replaced with an alternate before deliberations.
Gupta moved to suppress the interrogation statements as violative of Miranda and appealed after conviction; he also challenged the judge’s off-the-record communication with Juror 18A under Md. Rule 4-326(d)(2)(C).
The Court held the judge violated Rule 4-326(d)(2)(C) by responding off the record but found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; it also held Gupta did not unambiguously invoke his Miranda right to counsel pre-interrogation, so suppression was not required.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether off-the-record communication with Juror 18A violated Md. Rule 4-326(d)(2)(C) and if so whether it was prejudicial	Gupta: Judge violated the Rule by responding to juror through law clerk without notifying parties; prejudice presumed and requires new trial	State: The communication did not "pertain to the action" or, if it did, dismissal and replacement of juror made any error harmless	Court: Judge violated Rule 4-326(d)(2)(C); error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because parties later had on-the-record opportunities to provide input and juror was replaced before deliberations
Whether Gupta’s pre-interrogation demands for a lawyer in the holding cell invoked Miranda right to counsel, requiring suppression of post-warning statements	Gupta: Repeated demands for counsel while in custody and imminently to be interrogated triggered Miranda; detectives should have ceased questioning	State: Pre-interrogation requests were not made during custodial interrogation and thus cannot invoke Miranda; moreover statements were not used in State’s case-in-chief	Court: Pre-interrogation requests were made outside the context of custodial interrogation and were not an unambiguous invocation; Gupta waived implicitly by answering after Miranda warnings; suppression denial affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Harris v. State, 428 Md. 700 (Md. 2012) (ex parte juror communications that implicate juror's ability to continue deliberating fall within Rule 4-326(d))
Grade v. State, 431 Md. 85 (Md. 2013) (juror scheduling communication affecting panel composition triggers Rule 4-326(d) protections)
Denicolis v. State, 378 Md. 646 (Md. 2003) (State bears burden to show ex parte juror communication harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275 (Md. 2001) (rules on judge–juror communications are mandatory and must be followed)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings and right to counsel)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (invocation of right to counsel must be unambiguous)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (once counsel is requested, interrogation must cease until counsel is present unless accused initiates further discussion)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (U.S. 2010) (Miranda waiver may be implied by an uncoerced statement after warnings)
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (U.S. 1991) (Miranda protections confined to custodial interrogation; anticipatory invocation uncertain)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1980) (definition of custodial interrogation: words or actions reasonably likely to elicit incriminating response)
Fenner v. State, 381 Md. 1 (Md. 2004) (Miranda safeguards require custodial interrogation to attach)
Williams v. State, 445 Md. 452 (Md. 2015) (discusses context in which statements made in interrogation may implicate invocation or ambiguity of invocation)