992 F.3d 446
6th Cir.2021Background
- In December 2018 the ATF issued a Final Rule classifying all bump-stock–type devices as "machineguns" under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), reversing prior ATF letters that had treated many bump stocks as non‑machineguns.
- Plaintiffs (gun‑rights groups and individuals who own or would purchase bump stocks) sued and sought a preliminary injunction to block the Final Rule; the district court denied the injunction after applying Chevron deference and finding the ATF’s interpretation permissible.
- The Sixth Circuit panel majority reversed, holding Chevron deference does not apply to agency interpretations of criminal statutes and that, on the merits, § 5845(b)’s phrase “single function of the trigger” refers to the trigger’s mechanical depress‑release‑reset cycle, not the shooter’s single pull — so bump stocks are not machineguns under § 5845(b).
- The court concluded plaintiffs were likely to prevail and that irreparable harm (loss of property, potential criminal exposure) justified a preliminary injunction; it remanded for proceedings and limited the injunction’s potential geographic scope to the Sixth Circuit (declining a nationwide injunction).
- The opinion emphasizes separation-of‑powers, fair‑notice, and the rule of lenity as reasons to decline Chevron in the criminal context, and it relies on statutory text and context (and Staples) to adopt the mechanical reading of “single function of the trigger.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chevron deference applies to an agency interpretation of a criminal statute | Chevron should not apply because criminal laws are for courts; deference raises separation‑of‑powers, fair‑notice, and lenity concerns | ATF argued (and other circuits held) Chevron can apply to agency regulations even if criminal penalties attach | Chevron deference does not apply to agency interpretations of criminal statutes; courts must interpret such statutes themselves |
| Meaning of "single function of the trigger" in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) | Means the trigger’s mechanical function (depress‑release‑reset); bump stocks do not change that mechanical cycle | Means a shooter’s single pull/analogous motion; bump stocks allow multiple shots from a single shooter action, so they are machineguns | "Single function of the trigger" refers to the trigger’s mechanical process; bump stocks do not make a firearm fire more than one shot per trigger cycle |
| Whether bump stocks cause a firearm to fire "automatically" more than one shot by a single function of the trigger | Not reached as dispositive once "single function" resolved in plaintiffs’ favor | ATF argued "automatically" can encompass partially self‑acting devices like bump stocks | Court did not decide meaning of "automatically" because resolution on "single function" was dispositive |
| Appropriateness/scope of preliminary injunction | Plaintiffs: irreparable harm, likely success on merits; injunction appropriate (but not necessarily nationwide) | Government: public safety favors denial; argued deference unnecessary or the ATF interpretation permissible | Plaintiffs likely to succeed; preliminary injunction should have been granted; court limited scope considerations to Sixth Circuit / parties on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishes two‑step deference framework for agency statutory interpretation)
- United States v. Apel, 571 U.S. 359 (2014) (court stated it had never held that government readings of criminal statutes are entitled to deference)
- Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014) (criminal laws are for courts to construe; agency positions are not dispositive)
- Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (applied Chevron to agency regulation under a statute that authorized criminal penalties)
- United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (applied deference to SEC regulation issued under delegated authority, despite criminal implications)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (construed "automatic"/"fully automatic" in firearms context; Court focused on trigger depression leading to continuous fire)