Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 1026

Gulbrandson and Irene Katuran operated a Phoenix photography business, Memory Makers, and were romantically involved for about a year until January 1991.
On Valentine’s Day 1991 Gulbrandson became intoxicated, attacked Irene in the presence of friends, and hinted at killing her and the business.
Around March 11, 1991 Irene was found murdered; the state portrayed a brutal, premeditated killing with extensive injuries and forensic evidence linking Gulbrandson to the scene.
Gulbrandson was tried for first-degree murder and theft; insanity and lack of premeditation were raised as defenses; two doctors for the State opined Gulbrandson was sane.
Dr. Blinder, defense expert, diagnosed several mental illnesses but did not state Gulbrandson was legally insane; trial court limited his testimony to hypothetical scenarios.
Gulbrandson was sentenced to death after two sentencing hearings, with the court finding the murder especially heinous, cruel, or depraved and determining mitigators were insufficient.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Effectiveness of guilt-stage witness decision	Gulbrandson asserts trial counsel was ineffective for not calling him as a guilt-stage witness.	Gulbrandson contends counsel acted reasonably given risk of prejudice and credibility concerns.	No deficient performance; decision within reasonable professional judgment.
Recall of Dr. Blinder at sentencing	Gulbrandson argues recall of Dr. Blinder would have aided sentencing mitigation.	State contends evidence was cumulative and not prejudicial.	No prejudice; cumulative evidence did not alter sentence under Strickland/AEDPA.
New claim of rehabilitation testimony (injury to habeas petition)	Dr. Blinder’s rehab-opinion could have altered sentencing outcome.	Claim was procedurally barred and/or not exhausted.	Procedurally barred; not exhausted or properly raised.
Evidentiary hearing on ineffective-assistance claims	District court abused its discretion by denying hearings under Cullen v. Pinholster/Stokley.	Record before state court was sufficient; no hearing needed.	No abuse; Pinholster/Stokley bar federal evidentiary hearings for these merits-based claims.
Eighth Amendment victim-impact evidence	Impermissible victim-impact statements were improperly presented to the sentencing judge.	Judge-specific application of Booth Payne framework allows non-jury scrutiny in this context.	Not contrary to or an unreasonable application; judge-based context allowed under existing precedent.

State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93 (1983) (insanity testimony limitations in non-insanity cases)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (death-penalty aggravation framework)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (unreasonable-application standard under AEDPA)
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (attorney strategy and reasonable conduct; hindsight restraint)
Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15 (2010) (cumulative evidence and prejudice)
Bocharski, 189 P.3d 412 (Ariz. 2008) (gratuitous violence framework in aggravation)
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (victim-impact evidence at sentencing)
Bocherksi v. Arizona, 218 Ariz. 476 (2008) (en banc discussion on gratuitous violence)
Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027 (2011) (victim impact evidence in judge-sentenced cases)
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (limits on new evidence in AEDPA §2254(d)(1) review)
Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802 (2011) (evidentiary hearings under Pinholster framework)
Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039 (2003) (fair presentation and exhaustion requirements for claims)
Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044 (2005) (separate ineffective-assistance claims require separate exhaustion)