Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976

Background

Gulbrandson and Irene Katuran ran Memory Makers in Phoenix and were romantically involved for about a year until January 1991.
On Valentine’s Day 1991 Gulbrandson argued with Irene; he threatened to kill her and the business in front of friends.
A month later Irene was found dead in her home with brutal injuries; police connected the scene to Gulbrandson, including his fingerprints on a door and a blood-like scene.
Gulbrandson was indicted in Arizona for first-degree murder and theft; defenses included insanity and lack of premeditation under the M’Naghten standard.
At trial, Dr. Blinder diagnosed mental illness but did not opine insanity; the court limited direct testimony about Gulbrandson’s mental state, allowing indirect testimony via hypotheticals.
Gulbrandson was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and theft; at sentencing the court found aggravating factors (heinous, cruel, depraved) and considered mitigating factors but imposed the death penalty; post-conviction relief and habeas petitions followed, including challenges to counsel’s performance and the handling of Dr. Blinder’s testimony.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ineffective assistance for failing to call guilt-stage witness	Gulbrandson argues counsel should have called him to testify about his psychiatric history.	State contends calling Gulbrandson could have harmed the defense and was a tactical choice.	No, not unreasonable under Strickland; testimony could have harmed defense.
Ineffectiveness for not recalling Dr. Blinder at sentencing	Blinder’s 1997 affidavit could have shown diminished capacity and rehabilitation potential.	Evidence was cumulative and already before the court; no prejudice.	Not prejudicial under Strickland; the post-conviction court reasonably denied relief.
Exhaustion and procedural bar for rehabilitation testimony	Claim based on Dr. Blinder’s testimony on rehabilitation was presented.	Claim not fairly presented earlier and is procedurally barred.	Procedurally barred; cannot excusably raise here.
Evidentiary hearing under Cullen v. Pinholster	Evidentiary hearings should be allowed for new evidence supporting ineffective assistance.	Pinholster bars new evidence for §2254(d) merit review.	District court did not abuse by denying evidentiary hearing; record before state court governs.
Victim-impact evidence at sentencing (Booth Payne distinction)	Wrongful to consider victim impact as it inflames the sentencing judge.	Judge weighs factors; in this case sentencing occurred with judge, not jury.	Not unreasonable application; Booth concerns jury, here judge considered factors.
Authorization to file second/successive petition (Kolbell report)	Kolbell report undermines premeditation and aggravation findings; new claims.	Claims are procedurally barred or not meet §2244(b)(2).	Denied; claims either barred or lack prima facie showing under §2244(b).

Key Cases Cited

State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42 (Ariz. 1983) (factors for heinous, cruel or depraved murder; basis for aggravation)
State v. McMurtrey, 664 P.2d 637 (Ariz. 1983) (insanity testimony limitations in non-insanity cases)
Gulbrandson v. Arizona, 906 P.2d 579 (Ariz. 1995) (reference for factual murder scene in original trial (descriptive))
Bocharski v. Arizona, 189 P.3d 409 (Ariz. 2008) (gruesome murder and gratuitous violence standards)
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (victim impact evidence at sentencing; distinction for juries)
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (victim impact statements at sentencing; later qualified by Payne)
Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2011) (victim impact evidence when sentencing is by judge; not per se excluded)
Pinholster v. Cullen, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (limits federal evidentiary review to state-court record)
Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011) (evidentiary hearing limits under Pinholster)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (unreasonable application standard under §2254(d)(1))
Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383 (2010) (cumulation of evidence and prejudice)
Wright v. Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (2008) (precise standard for clearly established federal law)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (limits to new evidence in §2254(d) review)