Guerrero v. Guerrero, 362 P.3d 432

Juan and Pamela Guerrero dissolved their first marriage in 2005, remarried in 2006, and dissolved again in 2009 with a property settlement awarding Pamela half of Juan's military retirement and ownership of the marital home, plus an 18-month deadline to refinance to remove Juan from the mortgage.
In 2011 Pamela sought a QMRO to distribute Juan’s military retirement; Juan contended the second marriage was only 41 months and that Pamela failed to refinance the home as required.
Juan's retirement payments were later found to be composed entirely of disability payments (Chapter 61 Army disability and VA disability), with CRDP partially overlapping but not creating disposable retired pay.
The master and then the superior court ruled that disability pay is not divisible under USFSPA, leaving zero disposable retired pay for division and denying alimony as speculative.
Pamela sought Rule 60(b)(6) relief to reopen the property division; the court initially granted relief but later reversed it; the court then forced the sale of the home and awarded prevailing-party attorney’s fees, which the appellate court later vacated pending remand.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Juan's retirement is disposable under USFSPA	Pamela argues partial divisible share exists.	Juan contends retirement pay is entirely disability-based and nondisposable.	Disability pay not disposable; none divisible.
Whether a QMRO should have been issued to divide retirement	Pamela seeks a QMRO to enforce the agreed division.	Juan contends QMRO would be ineffectual and violate USFSPA.	Superior court did not err in refusing to issue an ineffectual QMRO.
Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief to reopen the property division was proper	Pamela asserts the underlying assumptions were destroyed by nondivisible retirement.	Juan argues the dissolution remains intact and nondivisible pay undermines reopening.	Abuse of discretion to deny reopening; remand for equitable division.
Whether the forced sale of the marital home was proper	Pamela argues forced sale is inappropriate given refinancing obstacles.	Juan argues noncompliance with refinance obligations justified sale.	Forced sale upheld; Pamela had not met refinance obligations within 18 months.
Attorney’s fees and prevailing-party determinations on remand	Fees awarded based on the existing disposition should stand.	Fees were awarded under Rule 82 after Rule 60(b)(6) relief was granted/denied.	Fees vacated pending remand and new determinations.

Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257 (Alaska 1992) (state courts cannot divide VA disability benefits or Chapter 61 retirement nondisposable pay)
Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989) (USFSPA precludes divesting retirement pay waived for disability benefits)
Young v. Lowery, 221 P.3d 1006 (Alaska 2009) (may divide only disposable retirement pay after waivers and survivor costs)
Glover v. Ranney, 314 P.3d 535 (Alaska 2013) (indemnification approach to prevent unilateral reductions of disposable retirement pay)
Hartley v. Hartley, 205 P.3d 342 (Alaska 2009) (contractual interpretation and equitable treatment in property divisions)