Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25581
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- Church uses recreation building in Guatay for worship since 1986; property zoned rural residential; various permits and modifications historically referenced as MUPs/plot plans; 1988–1989 activities included relocation plans and lack of completed permit; 2008 NOV and May 2008 letters alleged illegal religious assembly; Church paused services but later sought Use Permit while county inspected and cited multiple code violations; district court found ripeness issues and equitable estoppel lacking; Church appealed challenging ripeness and existence of permit; court ultimately affirmed dismissal for lack of ripe claims and unresolved final decision under Williamson County.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a valid Use Permit allowing religious use existed. | Guatay asserted permits covered religious use. | County permits expired or did not authorize religious use. | No valid Use Permit existed to authorize religious use. |
| Whether equitable estoppel bars enforcement. | Estoppel prevented enforcement due to county representations. | No substantial reliance; requirements not satisfied. | Equitable estoppel not proven. |
| Whether RLUIPA/§1983 claims are ripe. | Claims ripe despite no permit. | Ripeness requires final decision via full permit process. | Claims unripe without a complete Use Permit application. |
| Whether Williamson County final decision rule applies to RLUIPA claims. | Not required to exhaust final decision; CEQA/permits unnecessary. | Final decision required to define regulations’ application. | Final decision requirement applies; claims deemed premature. |
| Whether costs of permit process create a substantial burden under RLUIPA. | Costs of scoping letter impose substantial burden. | Record insufficient to prove substantial burden. | Not decided; record insufficient to assess burden. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1985) (final decision requirement for ripeness in land use)
- Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005) (applies Williamson County ripeness to RLUIPA/First Amendment claims; futility exception discussed)
- San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (RLUIPA/§1983 ripeness considerations in land use)
- Golden Gate Water Ski Club v. County of Contra Costa, 165 Cal. App. 4th 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (equitable estoppel in land use; non-enforcement not automatically equitable)
- Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, 371 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2004) (reliance on permit approvals; limits of estoppel in land use)
- Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1989) (discusses Williamson County ripeness applicability in land use)
- Harris v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1990) (procedural due process ripeness in land use)
- Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 938 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1991) (land use procedures and ripeness considerations)