Guardianship of Sebastien Chamberlain
118 A.3d 229
| Me. | 2015Background
- Marc Chamberlain lived apart from his two children since 2007; after the mother died in 2013 the maternal grandmother (and aunt) petitioned for guardianship; the Probate Court appointed the grandmother as guardian.
- Probate court found grandmother failed to meet §5-204(c)’s clear-and-convincing unfitness-type standard but found a "de facto guardian" and "demonstrated lack of consistent participation" by a preponderance under §5-204(d) and appointed guardianship.
- Chamberlain moved for reconsideration arguing the Due Process Clause requires a clear-and-convincing standard under §5-204(d); the motion was denied and he appealed, mounting a facial constitutional challenge to §5-204(d).
- The Maine Supreme Judicial Court considered vagueness, substantive due process, and procedural due process (standard-of-proof) challenges to §5-204(d).
- The court concluded §5-204(d) is facially unconstitutional to the extent it permits appointment over a parent’s objection on a preponderance standard; the appropriate constitutional standard is clear and convincing evidence.
- The Court vacated the probate judgment and remanded for application of the clear-and-convincing standard (and permitted the trial court discretion whether to reopen the record).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Chamberlain) | Defendant's Argument (grandmother / State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §5-204(d) is unconstitutionally vague | Definitions (e.g., "demonstrated lack of consistent participation") are vague and force guessing | Statute provides definitional guidance and enumerated factors; not vague as applied in some circumstances | Not facially void for vagueness; definitions give adequate guidance |
| Whether §5-204(d) violates substantive due process by not requiring a finding of unfitness | A judicial finding of parental unfitness is required before depriving parental rights | Lack of consistent participation can in some cases equate to unfitness; statute can be applied constitutionally in some circumstances | Declined to invalidate §5-204(d) on substantive due process grounds (not unconstitutional in all applications) |
| Whether the statutory residency/absence requirements offend substantive due process | Statute does not require proof child resided without parent for requisite period; this omission is unconstitutional | Even if residency proof were required, some applications would satisfy such a requirement | Not facially invalid on this ground |
| Whether the preponderance standard in §5-204(d) satisfies procedural due process | Preponderance is constitutionally inadequate given the severe and potentially permanent intrusion on parental rights; clear and convincing is required | Legislature set different standards for different guardianship paths; §5-204(d) uses preponderance and is facially permissible | Court holds preponderance is constitutionally deficient for §5-204(d); clear and convincing evidence is required; statute is unconstitutional to the extent it prescribes preponderance |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (facial challenge standard: invalidate only if no set of circumstances exists under which statute is valid)
- Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (facial challenges disfavored; avoid premature broad rulings)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (Mathews balancing; clear-and-convincing required for termination of parental rights)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (three-factor due-process balancing test)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (parental liberty interest in care and custody of children)
- Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (use of clear-and-convincing standard when important individual interests are at stake)
- In re Guardianship of Jewel M., 2 A.3d 301 (Me. 2010) (requirement of finding parental unfitness under §5-204(c))
- Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169 (Me. 2014) (de facto parenthood determinations require clear-and-convincing evidence)